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ARTICLES 
A New Market-Based Approach to Securities 
Law 
Kevin S. Haeberle† & M. Todd Henderson†† 
Modern securities regulation has three main areas, each of which is plagued 
by a core problem. Mandatory disclosure law leaves society with suboptimal disclo-
sure, as the government calls for too little of some information (for example, man-
agement analysis of company prospects) and too much of other information (for ex-
ample, data about trivial executive perks). Securities fraud law (specifically, its 
central fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance) yields damages at odds with any rea-
sonable theory of compensation and deterrence. And insider trading law fails to 
achieve its ends because incentives to police illegal trading and tipping by executives 
are currently weak. 
In this Article, we propose fixing these fundamental flaws of securities law by 
shifting much of the regulatory focus from firms to information. In particular, we 
introduce the idea of building the law around a well-regulated market for the public-
company information that sits at the center of each of the three main areas of secu-
rities law. Deploying this market, we argue, would trigger incentives for firms to 
disclose more information of value while also motivating them to more rigorously 
police illegal trading and tipping by their agents. Additionally, it would help regu-
lators identify when the law requires disclosure that is not socially valuable and 
assist in the identification of a class of securities fraud plaintiffs that is more in line 
with the goals of the anti-fraud regime. 
 
 † Associate Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. 
 †† Michael J. Marks Professor of Law and Mark Claster Mamolen Research Scholar, 
University of Chicago Law School. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars have proposed market-based solutions to the 
well-known shortcomings of modern securities law. Most interest-
ingly, it has been argued that there should be a market for the 
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law itself—with securities law following corporate law by allow-
ing firms to choose the best regime offered by states.1 Also note-
worthy are calls for leaving it to “the market” (namely, institu-
tional investors) to penalize firms that fail to share information 
appropriately2 and proposals to shift the focus of regulation from 
firms to investors.3 None of these proposals has been adopted de-
spite fervent support in some academic circles. 
In this Article, we consider a new market-based approach 
that should have broader appeal across the political spectrum. We 
imagine a market for tiered access to the public-company infor-
mation that sits at the center of securities law. A market for this 
information can play the lead role in fixing fundamental flaws of 
modern securities law. 
The Great Depression–era securities laws on which much of 
modern capitalism is built are designed to get the optimal amount 
of information about public firms into the hands of investors. To 
some, the end goal is the protection of ordinary investors.4 To oth-
ers, it is the protection of savvy professionals.5 Whatever the pre-
cise intent and dominant theoretical justifications, these inter-
connected laws are meant to enhance the accuracy of stock 
 
 1 See generally Roberta Romano, The Advantage of Competitive Federalism for 
Securities Regulation (AEI 2002); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L J 2359 (1998). 
 2 See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law 276–314 (Harvard 1996); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, 
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va L Rev 669, 709–13 (1984) 
(describing the potential advantages of a market regime but concluding that, based on the 
empirical research thus far, it is uncertain whether leaving the issue to the market is 
actually better than the status quo). The basic idea is that sophisticated investors will 
discount the value of companies in these instances, thereby changing company behavior 
by driving down stock prices in ways that matter for both firm owners and managers. 
 3 See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 
Cal L Rev 279, 304–09 (2000). 
 4 See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 70 Va L Rev at 693–94 (cited in note 2) 
(summarizing this view in the mandatory disclosure context, but labeling it “as unsophis-
ticated as the investors it is supposed to protect”). 
 5 See, for example, Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of 
Securities Regulation, 55 Duke L J 711, 713–14 (2006) (“Securities regulation is not a con-
sumer protection law. Rather, scholarly analysis of securities regulation must proceed on 
the assumption that the ultimate goal of securities regulation is to attain efficient finan-
cial markets and thereby improve the allocation of resources in the economy,” and for that 
reason, “the role of securities regulation is to create and promote a competitive market for 
information traders.”). 
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prices,6 thereby improving capital allocation and firm 
governance.7 
The federal securities laws include a foundational aspect (se-
curities disclosure law) along with two interrelated overlays (se-
curities fraud law and insider trading law). The disclosure regime 
compels information sharing. The anti-fraud overlay makes dis-
closures more credible, while restrictions on trading and tipping 
by insiders encourage timely information release and create in-
centives for information production outside the firm. 
Although critics have some objections to the fundamental 
theories behind these laws, to us and many others, the most 
damning objection is that their specific content and practical ap-
plication are flawed. For those who look closely enough, it should 
be apparent that the disclosure regime compels too much sharing 
of some information and too little of other information.8 It should 
likewise be clear that securities fraud case law creates class ac-
tions that have ballooned in size far beyond that which optimally 
compensates victims and deters perpetrators9 and that insider 
trading law suffers from underenforcement that keeps it from 
achieving its ends.10 Each of these problems has lingered for 
decades. 
Enter our proposal: address these problems with a well-
regulated market for tiered access to public-company infor-
mation.11 In this market, firms would be able to sell early access 
to their information to anyone who values it at at least the market 
price—so long as they did so transparently, on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis, and with full public disclosure of the information com-
ing soon after. For example, if a firm were going to release news 
to the public at noon, it would be allowed to sell private access to 
 
 6 See Merritt B. Fox, et al, Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: 
The New Evidence, 102 Mich L Rev 331, 368 (2003) (discussing empirical evidence showing 
that “mandatory disclosure can in fact increase the amount of meaningful information 
reflected in share prices and increase share price accuracy”). 
 7 See Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter 
Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 Va L Rev 1005, 1015–22 (1984) (discussing the 
main social benefits of enhanced stock-price accuracy). See also Marcel Kahan, Securities 
Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 Duke L J 977, 1028–34 (1992) 
(same); Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 Colum L Rev 237, 
254–55 (2009) (discussing how disclosure improves corporate governance). 
 8 See Part II.A. 
 9 See Part II.B. 
 10 See Part II.C. 
 11 We limit our proposal to a market for the information that public firms provide 
post-IPO, including information that is now disclosed both on an ongoing, periodic basis 
and when secondary offerings of securities are made. 
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the news seconds, minutes, or even hours prior to noon. In this 
type of market for tiered access to information, stock market par-
ticipants—such as high-speed traders and investment funds—
would be able to purchase access to what would soon be public 
disclosures. So too would those with extramarket demand, such 
as corporate watchdogs and the media. 
At first blush, this sounds like a scheme for the rich to get 
richer. If information is no longer “free,” only wealthy investors 
that paid for it would receive it. They would then have an ad-
vantage that would build on itself in a vicious circle (from the 
standpoint of ordinary investors). We take up this objection in 
more detail later in this Article,12 but we should say at the outset 
that it is exactly backward. The current system is perverse if pro-
tecting ordinary investors is the goal, and our proposal would in-
crease ordinary investors’ well-being. By making information 
traders—hedge funds, high-speed traders, and other similarly so-
phisticated professionals—bear the costs of corporate disclosures, 
the market we propose would act as a sort of Pigouvian tax on 
their trading. Because our proposed information releases would 
be announced in advance to everyone, the market would also help 
everyone else avoid the dangerous trading environment that 
arises whenever there are new releases of information.13 Better 
yet, the new approach should also encourage ordinary investors 
to refrain from trying to beat the professionals, something finance 
theory has been urging for six decades.14  
 
 12 See Part IV.A.2. 
 13 In a 2016 article, we undertook a close examination of legal efforts geared at en-
suring that market-moving information is made available to all at the exact same time 
when it is first shared beyond a small group of insiders or the like. See generally Kevin S. 
Haeberle and M. Todd Henderson, Information-Dissemination Law: The Regulation of 
How Market-Moving Information Is Revealed, 101 Cornell L Rev 1373 (2016). In that work, 
we criticized these legal efforts and noted in the conclusion that the relevant law could 
actually better meet its investor protection ends by allowing a market for tiered access to 
market-moving information so long as that market included basic regulatory protections 
to ensure transparency. See id at 1439–44. We discuss these points in more detail in 
Part III.A. 
 14 This is the central lesson arising out of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) and the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis. The idea is simple: extra-informational investors can 
earn higher returns with the same risk (or the same returns with lower risk) by following 
a buy-and-hold strategy—that is, buying a diverse portfolio of stocks and holding it for a 
long period. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J Fin 77, 77–79 (1952). Trying to 
buy and sell based on changes in information is a losing strategy for the masses because 
markets incorporate new information based on the trading of sophisticated professionals 
with striking speed. For a popular account of MPT and these dynamics, see generally 
Burton G. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street (Norton 1973). For a notable 
example of the speed at which information is incorporated into prices today, see Grace 
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The more compelling objection to our proposal may be that it 
would impede the incentives of trading professionals to generate 
information about stock prices. We do not know how much our 
proposed market will impact these incentives or how these “costs” 
should be traded off against the benefits of the market. But we 
take this up in detail below in laying out a framework for the de-
bate our proposal should spark.15 
The benefits of our proposal are potentially vast. The market 
could improve securities law as a whole by addressing each of the 
core problems mentioned above. First, the market could amelio-
rate the disclosure underproduction and overproduction prob-
lems.16 Firms would have a revenue-based motivation to give in-
vestors and others what they want, give it to them in a form that 
is most valuable to them, and do it more often than under current 
law. We would then require that any enhanced early-release 
product be made available to the full public within a relatively 
short time frame, thereby ensuring that the improved disclosure 
is available to all. Prices would also reveal what investors value 
and what they don’t. (Of course, if investors won’t pay but the in-
formation is socially valuable, the government could still man-
date its disclosure.17) 
Second, the market could lead to a much-needed reworking 
of private securities fraud litigation.18 For almost three decades, 
federal courts have allowed essentially anyone who purchased a 
public company’s stock to sue if the purchase was made during a 
period in which the stock price was inflated due to fraudulent cor-
porate statements. Without this broad approach, the economics of 
this area of litigation are said to preclude viable private enforce-
ment. But the approach permits suit by even those who, on an 
expected basis, are not harmed by these frauds. In addition, dam-
ages in these cases dwarf the gains of those committing the fraud. 
 
Xing Hu, Jun Pan, and Jiang Wang, Early Peek Advantage? Efficient Price Discovery with 
Tiered Information Disclosure, 126 J Fin Econ 399, 406–10 (2017) (“[T]he information con-
tent of the [University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment] has been fully incorpo-
rated into the market price during the first second of trading within the early peek 
window.”). 
 15 See Part IV.C. 
 16 We provide the relevant background to this argument in Part II.A, and we detail 
the argument in Part III.B.1. 
 17 In Part II.A.1, we discuss examples of recent prominent disclosure items with little 
(if any) financial value to firms and investors but—according to their proponents—much 
social value. See notes 68–78 and accompanying text. 
 18 We provide the relevant background to this argument in Part II.B and set forth 
the argument itself in Part III.B.2. 
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For these reasons, it is well established that society almost surely 
devotes more resources to these cases than can be justified by 
compensating victims and deterring fraud. Indeed, calls to scrap 
private litigation in the area altogether or to eliminate class ac-
tions through mandatory-arbitration clauses are common.19 
Instead of a continuation of the unacceptable status quo or 
risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater, courts could 
look to our proposed information market to identify the actual vic-
tims of securities fraud, certifying classes of those who purchased 
early-access rights to the information and then bought the stock 
while its price was still inflated. The end result would be a litiga-
tion device that allows class action suits yet avoids the current 
system’s compensation of the unharmed and waste of scarce re-
sources on cases of small marginal deterrence. 
Third, the market would increase company incentives to po-
lice illegal trading by their executives.20 Today, firms have much 
reason to turn a blind eye to this illegal trading.21 For one thing, 
executives generally determine the approach the firm takes with 
respect to this issue. For another, even when shareholders get to 
decide, there is much reason to remain passive. This is because 
current law requires firms to give away their information for free. 
From the perspective of firm owners, the information might as 
well be used in a way that saves the enterprise from having to 
provide its executives with other compensation. Our market, how-
ever, changes that calculus for firms in a way that would make 
them more likely to crack down on illicit insider trading. This is 
because buyers would be less interested in information that might 
already be baked into stock market prices through trading and 
tipping by insiders. Buyers would adjust the prices they would be 
willing to pay for information based on how well companies police 
insider trading. 
To the uninitiated, our proposal might seem like one of the 
several arguments calling for the legalization of insider trading 
itself.22 But the proposal is for something very different and, as 
 
 19 See, for example, A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-
Atlanta: The Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2007–2008 Cato S Ct 
Rev 217, 248–55 (proposing arbitration of certain elements of securities fraud suits). 
 20 We lay out the background to this argument in Part II.C and present the argument 
itself in Part III.B.3. 
 21 Prosecutors also have incentives to ignore this trading. See Part II.C. 
 22 See generally, for example, Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock 
Market (Free Press 1966). 
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we explain,23 would in no way violate insider trading law or even 
trigger the social problems it targets. This statement is supported 
by the fact that legalizing insider trading would be unlikely to 
produce any of the key benefits summarized above. Instead, as we 
explain below,24 the information market and these benefits are 
precluded by only a far less prominent administrative rule requir-
ing firms to make disclosures in a simultaneous fashion and a 
more general regulatory attitude against tiered information 
revelation. 
The remainder of this Article tells our full story. Part I de-
scribes the three-pronged legal response to the market failures 
that are thought to plague the sale of securities: modern securi-
ties law with its focus on compelling information sharing in an 
honest manner without predisclosure trading by insiders.25 
Part II then provides an overview of the core flaws of this area of 
law, focusing on suboptimal levels of disclosure, overinclusive pri-
vate fraud actions, and underprosecution of insider trading. Next, 
Part III sets forth the specifics of our proposal to fix these flaws 
with our new market-based approach. Lastly, Part IV addresses 
a number of key objections—namely, ones relating to fairness, 
supply, demand, outside information production, and insider 
trading law. This final Part, when viewed along with what pre-
cedes it, thus presents a framework for the discussion we hope to 
spark about the desirability of addressing core shortcomings of 
modern securities law with a market for the information around 
which it centers. 
I.  THREE MAIN ASPECTS OF MODERN SECURITIES LAW 
Three especially notable market failures are said to be 
present when it comes to buying and selling the securities of pub-
lic companies. First, left to their own devices, many firms will fall 
well short of the optimal level of information disclosure about 
their condition and prospects.26 Second, even when firms share 
such information, there is the concern that it will be presented in 
 
 23 See Part IV.A.1 (providing the full version of the points previewed in this 
paragraph). 
 24 See Part III.A. 
 25 Readers familiar with securities law can skip over this brief background Part, be-
ginning instead with Part II. 
 26 We provide a detailed description of this disclosure underproduction problem in a 
recent work. See Kevin S. Haeberle and M. Todd Henderson, Making a Market for 
Corporate Disclosure, 35 Yale J Reg 383, 390–93 (2018). 
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a misleading—if not altogether untruthful—way.27 Third, firm 
insiders may trade on company information before making it 
available to the market, thereby reducing both their incentive to 
release information in a timely manner28 and outsiders’ incentives 
to invest in information production of their own.29 
The legal response to these three problems is the enormous 
body of law known as modern securities regulation.30 At least at a 
general level, this area of law can be boiled down to a mandatory 
disclosure regime and its two main supports—one that prohibits 
fraud and another that restricts insider trading. Each, in turn, 
sets out to remedy the three market failure concerns. In brief, the 
disclosure regime addresses the information underproduction 
concern by requiring public companies to generate and release a 
wide array of information. The anti-fraud rules address the infor-
mation integrity problem by trying to ensure that disclosures are 
in fact reliable, and the insider trading rules address the alleged 
social harm arising out of trading activity by insiders that pre-
dates full public disclosure. In this Part, we briefly introduce each 
of these three main aspects of securities law before critiquing 
them in Part II and showing how they can be improved by our 
proposal in Parts III and IV. 
 
 27 See, for example, Dan Cable and Freek Vermeulen, Stop Paying Executives for 
Performance, (Harv Bus Rev, Feb 23, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/6JQL-RMPU 
(noting the disconcerting incentives created by aligning management pay with company 
market performance). 
 28 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, 
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 S Ct Rev 309, 333 (arguing 
that, if allowed to trade, insiders would hold onto material information for personal gain 
through quiet trading in the market over prolonged periods rather than sharing it with 
the public promptly). But see Dennis W. Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of 
Insider Trading, 35 Stan L Rev 857, 879 (1982) (“[I]nsider trading in some cases may ac-
celerate the speed of disclosure because the ability to profit is dependent on information 
reaching the market. Thus insiders, if allowed to trade, may have strong incentives to 
communicate information to the market.”); id at 892. 
 29 See Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and 
“Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 Va L Rev 1229, 1257–58 (2001); id at 1261 
(stating that “[p]ermitting insiders to trade on inside information will drive analysts out 
of the market”).  
 30 To many, this response predated the identification of the underlying social prob-
lems. See generally, for example, Homer Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure: 
Regulation in Search of a Purpose (Law & Business 1979). But even if that is the case, the 
concerns we lay out above form the principal current theoretical justifications for the main 
parts of securities law. 
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A. Securities Disclosure Law 
The government has responded to the disclosure underpro-
duction concern with a command-and-control approach that links 
company access to public markets with coerced disclosure. The 
mandatory disclosure regime constitutes the foundation of mod-
ern securities law. 
The mandatory disclosure obligation arose following the 
stock market crash of 1929. At that time, there was a view that 
speculation in securities based on incomplete information caused 
the sudden market drop and, in turn, the argument went, the 
Depression.31 The first major piece of modern federal securities 
regulation, found in the Securities Act of 193332 (Securities Act), 
was therefore a system of mandatory disclosure according to a de-
tailed government recipe. The idea was to reduce informational 
asymmetries between firms and investors. Since the passage of 
the Securities Act, firms have been able to sell securities to the 
public only if they first share vast amounts of information about 
themselves according to detailed government requirements. The 
Securities Exchange Act of 193433 (Exchange Act) continued this 
same approach beyond the new-issuance context, imposing the 
United States’ famous ongoing, periodic disclosure regime for 
public firms. 
Over time, a vast complex has been erected on these New 
Deal–era foundations.34 Public companies spend many tens of bil-
lions of dollars each year producing and disseminating infor-
mation about themselves in compliance with the law. Today, hun-
dreds of items must be disclosed in registration statements upon 
the new issuance of shares. In fact, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regulation known as Regulation S-K that 
guides companies through the core disclosure process takes up 
over two hundred pages, and it merely lists what information 
firms must share with the public.35 Disclosure doesn’t stop there. 
 
 31 See Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street: A History of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance 14–38 (Houghton Mifflin 
1982). But see Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the 
United States: 1867–1960 305–08 (Princeton 1971) (“[The crash’s] direct financial effect 
was confined to the stock market and did not arouse any distrust of banks by their 
depositors.”). 
 32 48 Stat 74, codified as amended at 15 USC § 77a et seq. 
 33 48 Stat 881, codified as amended at 15 USC § 78a et seq. 
 34 See Fox, 109 Colum L Rev at 241–49 (cited in note 7) (discussing the evolution of 
mandatory disclosure laws in the United States). 
 35 See SEC, Regulation S-K, 17 CFR § 229. 
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Public companies must disclose large amounts of information in 
10-Qs (quarterly) and 10-Ks (annually). They also are required to 
share news of certain significant firm events by filing an 8-K 
within four days of their occurrence.36 
The resulting disclosure is voluminous. When Facebook went 
public, it filed a Form S-1 with the SEC that ran nearly three 
hundred pages, describing in exact detail essentially every aspect 
of its business operations, results, management, and forecasts.37 
Every year, Facebook discloses many times this amount of infor-
mation in its ongoing, periodic disclosures. In 2016, for instance, 
its disclosures ran about eleven hundred normal pages of twelve-
point font.38 
B. Securities Fraud Law 
Anti-fraud law buttresses mandatory disclosure law. The 
latter compels corporate statements, while the former helps en-
sure that those statements are credible. 
Of course, fraud—or at least “deceit”—has long been out-
lawed under the common law in all fifty states.39 But a special 
place in federal law has been reserved for deceptive statements 
made in the securities context: § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and 
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.40 Rule 10b-5 makes most de-
ceptions in securities transactions illegal by outlawing both false 
statements as well as those that are technically true yet mislead-
ing.41 Related provisions do the same, albeit in a more limited set 
 
 36 See SEC, Form 8-K *2, archived at http://perma.cc/WS7R-M75W. 
 37 See Facebook, Inc, Form S-1 Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 
1933 (SEC, Feb 1, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/GQC5-ER7S. 
 38 To estimate this in at least a rough manner, we downloaded each Facebook disclo-
sure on the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database, 
cut and pasted it into Microsoft Word, converted the font to Times twelve-point font, and 
did a page count. 
 39 See, for example, Chiarella v United States, 445 US 222, 227–28 (1980) (“At com-
mon law, misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance upon the false state-
ment is fraudulent.”). 
 40 Section 10(b) is codified at 15 USC § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 at 17 CFR § 240.10b-5. 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 operate as a set, as the former is not self-executing. More 
technically, a violation of Rule 10b-5 constitutes a violation of § 10(b). 
 41 See Rule 10b-5(b), 17 CFR § 240.10b-5(b) (making it illegal “[t]o make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading”). 
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of circumstances.42 More generally, the robust, nationwide prohi-
bition on fraud found in these interconnected provisions essen-
tially federalizes the tort of deceit when it is committed in the 
securities context.43 
Notably, nothing in § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 limits their applica-
tion to required statements. For that reason, corporate speech be-
yond that which is required is also policed for fraud. Accordingly, 
the provisions increase the reliability of corporate representa-
tions well beyond those made in public filings with the SEC. 
In the end, this second main area of modern securities law 
reduces the extent to which firms and their agents lie and mis-
lead—thereby mitigating the information integrity problem noted 
at the outset of both this Article and this Part. 
C. Insider Trading Law 
The third pillar of modern securities law—insider trading 
law—is on par with the legal responses embodied in securities 
disclosure and securities fraud law. But here the approach of the 
law is less straightforward. In fact, even those who are sympa-
thetic to its ends are often flummoxed by the doctrine.44 
Aspects of state law have restricted insider trading to some 
degree since at least the early twentieth century.45 Specifically, 
expansive interpretations of the common law of deceit as well as 
 
 42 See § 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 USC § 77q(a) (making the same basic conduct 
illegal when it occurs with respect to the “offer or sale of any securities”); § 8(b) of the 
Securities Act, 15 USC § 77h(b) (targeting securities registration statements that are ei-
ther “incomplete or inaccurate in any material respect”); § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 
15 USC § 77l(a)(2) (outlawing offers and sales of securities made “by means of a prospectus 
or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading”). 
 43 These provisions also target silent deceptions when the alleged fraudster owes the 
putative victim a duty to speak, yet fails to do so. See, for example, Chiarella, 445 US at 
230 (noting that “silence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate 
as a fraud actionable under § 10(b) . . . [b]ut such liability is premised upon a duty to 
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence”). This exception to the general 
rule of caveat emptor is relevant to our discussion of insider trading law in the next 
Section, but not to our discussion of affirmative misrepresentations in this one. 
 44 For a comprehensive review of insider trading law, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, An 
Overview of Insider Trading Law and Policy: An Introduction to the Research Handbook 
on Insider Trading, in Stephen M. Bainbridge, ed, Research Handbook on Insider Trading 
1–30 (Elgar 2013). For a recent critique of insider trading law’s form, see generally Richard 
A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading after United States 
v. Newman, 125 Yale L J 1482 (2016). 
 45 For a seminal look at how the common law of deceit was said to restrict insider 
trading in limited circumstances, see Strong v Repide, 213 US 419, 433–35 (1909). 
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the fiduciary duties at the heart of corporate law have long com-
bined to stop some instances of insider buying from existing 
shareholders.46 But even then, this “special facts” doctrine held 
that the prohibition applied only when there were, well, special 
facts, such as those involving face-to-face transactions by para-
digmatic insiders.47 Whatever the direction of that law through-
out the earlier and middle parts of the twentieth century, it is 
clear that courts have for some time been reluctant to expand it.48 
One large determinant of this direction has been the existence of 
federal law on point since the passage of the foundational federal 
securities acts in the 1930s.49 
Two federal securities laws that explicitly target insider trad-
ing are worth mentioning. The main one merely requires mem-
bers of a small group of corporate executives at each public com-
pany to disclose their trades in company stock and to disgorge any 
profits they make on relatively quick purchases and then sales (or 
short sales and later purchases).50 The other one relates to dam-
ages in private suits under the much more relevant federal laws 
that are interpreted as restrictions on insider trading.51 
But most insider trading law is judge made. According to 
long-standing Supreme Court precedent, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 
which do not mention insider trading, prohibit the fraud that is 
said to occur in two situations that involve insider trading. 
First, under the “classical theory” of insider trading, firm 
officers and directors who buy or sell stock in their own company 
on the basis of material, nonpublic information are said to de-
fraud their trading counterparties.52 The theory is that these 
“classical insiders” owe a fiduciary duty to existing sharehold-
ers.53 This duty is not one of the three main corporate law duties 
 
 46 See id. 
 47 See id; Goodwin v Agassiz, 186 NE 659, 660–61 (Mass 1933). 
 48 See, for example, Freeman v Decio, 584 F2d 186, 188–96 (7th Cir 1978) (declining 
to adopt an expansive ruling on the fiduciary duty owed by corporate officers and directors 
to stock purchasers). 
 49 See id at 195 (reading the state law restriction narrowly because, among other 
reasons, “the 10b-5 class action has made substantial advances toward becoming the kind 
of effective remedy for insider trading that the [New York State] court of appeals [had 
previously] hoped that it might become”). 
 50 The disclosure obligation is found in § 16(a) of the Exchange Act, and the disgorge-
ment provision in § 16(b). See 15 USC § 78p. 
 51 See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-
704, 102 Stat 4677, codified in various sections of Title 15. 
 52 See Chiarella, 445 US at 226–28. 
 53 See id at 227–28. See also id at 228 (noting that the SEC had previously “recog-
nized a relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders of a corporation and 
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relating to obedience, care, and loyalty. Rather, it is a specialized 
duty to disclose information to counterparties or abstain from 
trading with them54 (or tipping others with an eye toward doing 
the same55). And unlike under common law deceit, the duty is 
owed to even nonexisting shareholders, as an instantaneous fidu-
ciary relationship is said to form upon entering into the transac-
tion with new shareholders.56 Accordingly, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
generally prohibit the top corporate brass (and their tippees) from 
using the company’s material, nonpublic information to profit by 
purchasing or selling company stock. 
Second, under the “misappropriation theory,” a firm director, 
officer, or indeed anyone else inside or outside the firm, is said to 
engage in fraud when she deceptively trades based on material, 
nonpublic information in violation of a fiduciary duty to the source 
of that information.57 Everyone who owes a duty of confidentiality 
amounting to a fiduciary duty to a firm yet secretly uses the in-
formation for trading profits is said to have deceived the firm in 
a way that constitutes federal securities fraud.58 This theory thus 
covers conduct that can also violate the classical theory of insider 
trading. After all, if the CEO takes company information and uses 
it with respect to a trade in company stock without the firm’s per-
mission, she has likely both violated her “disclose or abstain” duty 
to counterparties as well as her fiduciary duty to the firm. But the 
theory also encompasses “insider” trading by outsiders.59 This 
holds even when the trading at issue is based on information that 
does not come directly from inside a firm whose stock is being 
traded. In fact, it can apply when the information is that gener-
ated by people or entities with no connection to the firm.60 All that 
 
those insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason of their position with 
that corporation”), citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co, 40 SEC 907, 911–13 (1961). 
 54 See Chiarella, 445 US at 226–28. 
 55 See Dirks v Securities and Exchange Commission, 463 US 646, 659–60 (1983). 
 56 See Chiarella, 445 US at 227. 
 57 See United States v O’Hagan, 521 US 642, 652 (1997). 
 58 See id at 665–66. 
 59 For a seminal article on this issue years before the misappropriation theory was 
adopted by the federal courts, see Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational 
Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv L Rev 322, 363–67 (1979) (“If a 
person acquires nonpublic information which he is forbidden by loyalty to his source from 
disclosing, that prohibition alone should be enough to suggest to him that his information 
is exclusive, and to subject him to liability for violating the disclose-or-refrain rule.”). 
 60 For an interesting application of this point, see the Stop Trading on Congressional 
Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act), Pub L No 112-105, 126 Stat 291 (prohibiting mem-
bers of Congress from trading on nonpublic information learned through their official 
roles). See also Jeanne L. Schroeder, Taking Stock: Insider and Outsider Trading by 
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is required is trading-focused misappropriation of information 
from its source in violation of some fiduciary duty.61 A lawyer who 
trades based on confidential information obtained from even a 
client (including a noncorporate one) can find herself on the 
wrong side of the law. 
* * * 
As this Part shows, modern securities law is centered on the 
famous Depression-era disclosure laws and their progeny, along 
with two related overlays. These interconnected laws get credible 
information out of firms and into the hands of investors in a 
timely fashion. In so doing, they address the perceived market 
failures we note at the outset of this Part. But as we discuss in 
the next Part, in their current forms, these three main aspects of 
securities law are flawed in ways that prevent them from opti-
mally achieving their ends. 
II.  FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS OF THE LAW 
Each of the three pillars of securities law overviewed above 
falls significantly short today. As we explain in this Part, the 
government-run disclosure regime likely results in too much dis-
closure of some information, while still producing too little of 
other information. The securities fraud regime also contains a 
central imperfection: overinclusive private class actions that have 
strayed far from any reasonable understanding of the victim-
compensation and perpetrator-deterrence goals that motivate 
them. Lastly, whatever might be admired in the substance of in-
sider trading law, the enforcement of that body of law against ac-
tual corporate executives is weak, thereby keeping it from achiev-
ing its ends. 
A. Overdisclosure, Underdisclosure 
Although a mandatory disclosure regime may be a logical 
enough way to address underproduction incentives for corporate 
information, government agents are not the main consumers of 
corporate information and therefore do not have ideal incentives 
to optimize disclosures. Investors are the intended beneficiaries 
 
Congress, 5 Wm & Mary Bus L Rev 159, 165–66 (2014) (detailing the STOCK Act’s 
framework). 
 61 See O’Hagan, 521 US at 652; Brudney, 93 Harv L Rev at 367 (cited in note 59). 
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of this information, and the government is merely guessing about 
what information they want. Even when the government is aided 
through public comment and private dialogue with information 
consumers, this creates two significant problems. As this Section 
explains, the disclosure rules and requirements that have 
amassed since 1933 present obvious overproduction concerns. At 
the same time, the opposite often is true with respect to other in-
formation, as the regime—especially when viewed along with its 
speech-chilling anti-fraud overlay—does not catch all information 
of value. 
1. The overproduction flaw. 
Even if one believes, as we do, that there are instances when 
compelling disclosure has value for investors or society as a 
whole, there are several reasons to be concerned that government 
mandates will call for companies to disclose information when the 
social benefits of the disclosure are outweighed by its production 
costs.62 
Government officials operate subject to various political pres-
sures and outside influences that often favor more information 
rather than less.63 They will therefore reap benefits from disclo-
sure that is not of value to shareholders, traders, and society more 
generally. All the while, these officials do not bear anywhere near 
the full costs of disclosure requirements, making them more in-
clined to impose those requirements even when society would not 
benefit. 
These points can be seen by thinking about two of the biggest 
interest groups with sway at the SEC: lawyers and accountants. 
Members of each profit tremendously in direct proportion to the 
volume and complexity of corporate disclosures.64 Securities 
lawyers are the ones who prepare corporate disclosures. They are 
 
 62 For a look at disclosure overproduction more generally, see Omri Ben-Shahar and 
Carl E. Schneider, More than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 
(Princeton 2014). 
 63 See notes 68–74 and accompanying text. 
 64 See Easterbrook and Fischel, 70 Va L Rev at 671–72 (cited in note 2): 
The securities laws may be designed to protect special interests at the expense 
of investors. . . . Many lawyers are specialized in securities work, and other mar-
ket professionals depend on the intricacies of the law for much revenue. . . . 
[They] would suffer windfall losses if existing regulations were repealed. Thus 
they have every incentive to support the status quo on an interest-group basis. 
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likewise the ones who file and defend suits when those informa-
tional products are defective. Auditing firms also play integral 
roles with respect to both the provision of disclosure and litigation 
surrounding the same.65 Moreover, each group of professionals 
moves in and out of government.66 The more that the law they 
help shape requires firms to generate and share information, the 
larger the private sector award waiting for them when their tour 
of duty is complete.67 
Bureaucrats also face pressure to stray from pure securities-
based disclosures into corporate governance and even politics. 
Corporate governance is traditionally an area of state law domin-
ion. Nevertheless, Congress and the SEC frequently add govern-
ance goodies to the basket of disclosure items without clear evi-
dence that state law is insufficient. This is perhaps because new 
disclosure requirements are salient evidence of regulatory action 
and easy to justify—how many government officials are against 
more information?  
Further, these federal-level disclosure requirements also 
generally represent regulation with diffuse costs. One recent ex-
ample is the Dodd-Frank Act’s provision relating to the disclosure 
of the ratio between the CEO’s pay and that of the median worker 
at the company.68 This information has obvious political value to 
those who are dissatisfied with the current distribution of wealth 
 
 65 See Lisa H. Nicholson, A Hobson’s Choice for Securities Lawyers in the Post-Enron 
Environment: Striking a Balance between the Obligation of Client Loyalty and Market 
Gatekeeper, 16 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 91, 100–01 (2002): 
In fact, several SEC commissioners have individually, and the SEC has collec-
tively, remarked from time to time that the SEC would be unable to administer 
the federal securities laws effectively without the assistance of market profes-
sionals such as lawyers, accountants and underwriters, whose integrity and 
competence serve to protect the investing public. 
 66 See Highlights of GAO-11-654, Securities and Exchange Commission: Existing 
Post-Employment Controls Could Be Further Strengthened (Government Accountability 
Office, July 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/6RZX-QXHU. 
 67 For an interesting empirical study on this point, see Ed deHaan, et al, The 
Revolving Door and the SEC’s Enforcement Outcomes: Initial Evidence from Civil 
Litigation, 60 J Accounting & Econ 65, 91 (2015). 
 68 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 111-203, 
124 Stat 1376 (2010), codified at 12 USC § 5301 et seq. 
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in society,69 yet no financial value to firms and investors.70 In fact, 
the information might be of negative value to them, for example 
by restricting them from attracting the best talent to take the 
helm.71 
The problem can even be seen with the base of the mandatory 
disclosure regime itself. Professors Paul Mahoney, George 
Benston, and others have argued that the passage of the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act did not provide shareholders 
of any firm with information they valued as shareholders at a 
level higher than the costs its generation and sharing imposed on 
the company—and therefore themselves.72 Even if they were 
wrong about the 1930s, their arguments are likely much more 
powerful today with respect to a number of specific disclosure 
items—especially given the massive expansion of private securi-
ties fraud suits73 and its implications for the cost of additional 
statements.74 For example, it is estimated that post–Financial 
Crisis rules requiring the disclosure of “conflict minerals” in 
firms’ supply chains have imposed $700 million in added disclo-
sure work each year.75 Few, if any, believe in the existence of in-
vestor benefits from this requirement that offset these costs. Even 
 
 69 For a news article reporting on the first set of public-company disclosures made 
pursuant to this new disclosure requirement and demonstrating the political power of this 
information, see Theo Francis and Vanessa Fuhrmans, In a First, US Firms Reveal 
Workers’ Pay Gap with CEO, Wall St J A1 (Mar 12, 2018). 
 70 For a critique of the financial value of a Dodd-Frank Act disclosure requirement 
of the same vintage, see Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 Harv Bus L 
Rev 129, 158–61 (2016). 
 71 For the CEO perspective on these rules, see The Materiality Standard for Public 
Company Disclosure: Maintain What Works *9–10 (Business Roundtable, Oct 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/8R3R-68HV (asserting that the CEO pay ratio rule fails to con-
vey material information to investors while also harming firms). 
 72 See Paul G. Mahoney, Wasting a Crisis: Why Securities Regulation Fails 77–99 
(Chicago 2015) (discussing how the Exchange Act did not improve disclosure practices, 
especially compared to the New York Stock Exchange’s disclosure standards); George J. 
Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am Econ Rev 132, 153 (1973) (concluding that “the disclosure 
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had no measurable positive effect on 
the securities traded on the [New York Stock Exchange],” that “[t]here appears to have 
been little basis for the legislation and no evidence that it was needed or desirable,” and 
that “there is doubt that more required disclosure is warranted”). 
 73 See Part II.B (explaining the fraud-on-the-market expansion to securities 
fraud law). 
 74 See Part II.A.2 (discussing the connection between these suits and disclosure 
underproduction). 
 75 The Dodd-Frank Act added § 13(p) to the Exchange Act of 1934, requiring the SEC 
to issue rules mandating disclosure of the presence or absence of some “conflict minerals” 
in their supply chains. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1502, 124 Stat at 2213–18. At the time of its 
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when factoring in the larger social benefits of public outing of this 
information, most commentators are likewise dubious of the wel-
fare outcome.76 And even assuming it is in society’s interest to 
know more about blood diamonds, we see no reason why the in-
terest should be bundled into securities law disclosures as op-
posed to disclosures compelled by Congress or an agency other 
than the one whose mission is to “protect investors, maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”77 
2. The underproduction flaw. 
The mandatory disclosure regime is also likely underinclusive 
at the same time, leaving the failure of market forces to produce 
enough corporate disclosure underaddressed in many instances.78 
At the most basic level, it is doubtful that the government is 
able to identify and compel all of the information production that 
users (and potential users) of corporate information would find 
valuable beyond its cost of production. This conclusion should 
come as little surprise. We wouldn’t think a government ministry 
of the internet would be able to accurately predict consumer de-
mand for social media application features, so why would the SEC 
do better with respect to demand for corporate information? The 
room for miscalculation is simply too great, at least with respect 
to the demand for company information. This is especially true 
because there is significant heterogeneity of preferences across 
investors for a bureaucratic agency to satisfy investor demand op-
timally—let alone the demand of a broader range of information 
consumers. This remains true as a general matter even if inter-
action between regulators and information consumers reduces 
some degree of the problem. 
 
adoption, the SEC estimated that this rule would cost $3 billion to $4 billion when imple-
mented, and then $207 million to $609 million each year thereafter. SEC, Conflict 
Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed Reg 56274, 56334 (2012), codified at 17 CFR §§ 240, 249b. 
One report estimated that compliance with the requirement would actually cost US inves-
tors over $700 million per year. See Chris N. Bayer, Dodd-Frank Section 1502: Post-Filing 
Survey 2014 *26 (Payson Center for International Development), archived at 
http://perma.cc/SC2Z-UDEV. 
 76 See, for example, Schwartz, 6 Harv Bus L Rev at 158–61 (cited in note 70); Lauren 
Wolfe, How Dodd-Frank Is Failing Congo (Foreign Policy, Feb 2, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/UY8K-YENL (reporting that, according to critics of the rule, “the conflict 
minerals movement has yet to lead to meaningful improvement on the ground, and has 
had a number of unintended and damaging consequences”). 
 77 What We Do (SEC, June 10, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/ZNR5-8LCX. 
 78 In our recent work, we provided an in-depth look at this disclosure underproduc-
tion problem. See generally Haeberle and Henderson, 35 Yale J Reg 383 (cited in note 26). 
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On this note, the problems of bureaucracies and public-choice 
economics also frustrate the command-and-control approach to 
disclosure in a way that matters for the underproduction con-
cern.79 Whether to satisfy political masters or because of regula-
tory capture, the SEC may resist requiring disclosure of things 
investors care about, or simply underestimate the benefits of cer-
tain disclosures. While the SEC is tasked with serving the public 
interest, it may deviate from that goal for a number of other well-
known reasons. For example, the best and the brightest will not 
always run and staff the agency.80 Government agents may have 
incentives to work on projects that receive the most attention in 
the news rather than the ones that serve the public interest.81 All 
the while, the forces of competition that might otherwise keep the 
agency from losing touch with information demands are not 
present. For example, instead of spending time optimizing the 
type of information that investors demand, the SEC may focus on 
topics that garner more headlines, such as corporate governance 
goodies, illicit trading by rich people, or political contributions by 
firms.82 
The same principles apply with respect to the broader audi-
ence of individuals and entities that value information about pub-
lic companies. Other types of investors and a large universe of 
noninvestors who consume corporate information may not be best 
served by disclosure laws set forth by a government agency with 
the investor-protection, market-efficiency, and capital-formation 
mission recited above as opposed to their broader needs. The gov-
ernment officials determining what firms must disclose would 
need to be dialed in to the optimal level that encompasses not just 
the well-being of investors, but that of these groups as well. And 
significantly, they would also have to weigh the tradeoffs among 
the various groups when their demands are in conflict or point in 
opposite directions. The officials promulgating the relevant rules 
would presumably need to hold more power than what Congress 
 
 79 See notes 64–67 and accompanying text. 
 80 For a critique of SEC competence in certain matters, see generally Robert J. Rhee, 
The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure, and the Business Education of Lawyers, 
35 J Corp L 363 (2009). 
 81 See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, and Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement 
Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 Duke L J 737, 777–78 (2003) (discussing evidence 
suggesting that the SEC may prefer prosecuting weak opponents to maximize its chances 
of winning suits—in contrast to its stated practice of focusing on cases with significant 
investor losses). 
 82 See text accompanying notes 75–77. 
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has delegated to the SEC with respect to securities-focused 
disclosure.83 
Lastly, and crucially, the fundamental flaws of the current 
anti-fraud regime supply an additional antidisclosure force. We 
discuss those flaws in detail in the next Section. But it is worth 
noting the intersection of these two regimes at this point. The cost 
of the disclosure integrity provided by the anti-fraud regime84 
comes in the form of considerable legal risk imposed on infor-
mation revelation.85 Additional statements mean additional expo-
sure to lawsuits based on the allegation that those statements are 
false or misleading.86 If these suits were costless and perfect at 
targeting actual fraud, this would not deter valuable disclosure. 
But no educated commentator believes the system is either of 
these things. Quite the contrary, these lawsuits are notoriously 
expensive to defend, thus opening up corporate speakers to strike 
 
 83 The main delegation of rulemaking authority with respect to disclosure for already 
public firms is found in § 13 of the Exchange Act, codified at 15 USC § 78m. Although its 
language is quite broad, the preamble to § 13(a) states that whatever disclosure the SEC 
prescribes under the section must be “necessary or appropriate for the proper protection 
of investors and to insure fair dealing in the security.” 
 84 See Part I.B. 
 85 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 
Brooklyn L Rev 763, 770–72 (1995): 
[T]he securities laws themselves reduce the amount of information that is pro-
vided by issuers because they impose significant liability for the production of 
misinformation. . . . This strategy of requiring that information be produced to 
a “gold standard” is at the heart of the disclosure program as it is traditionally 
understood. The insight, so accepted in the free speech area, that high standards 
of liability for the production of erroneous information will, as one of its effects, 
reduce the production of any information, is unacknowledged in the securities 
area. But unacknowledged or not, the liability structure of the securities laws 
reduces the production of information. 
See also id at 840–41: 
One way for issuers to respond to this [litigation] risk is to reduce the number of 
statements they make, and the definiteness of those they do make. Issuers are 
likely to respond in this way as their ability to predict whether any given state-
ment will lead to litigation or liability decreases. Their difficulty in prediction 
may result from their own inability to determine whether the statement is mis-
leading or incomplete, their inability to predict when litigation will occur, or 
their inability to predict the outcome of litigation when it does occur. Saying less 
means litigating less and being held liable less often. Liability is a cost of the 
activity of making statements, and will reduce the level of that activity. 
 86 Id at 840–41. 
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suits.87 Even a truthful statement may be worth a sizeable settle-
ment if the company can settle for less than the costs of fighting.88 
Given the large error costs with respect to the ultimate outcome 
of each stage of these suits (including the stage when the jury 
reads the verdict), that risk hangs like a dark cloud over a firm, 
thereby increasing the expected costs of disclosure. That securi-
ties fraud cases often turn on the meaning of complex corporate 
statements targeted at specialized audiences only increases this 
risk (and those costs) given that the statements will be evaluated 
by judges and jurors. 
This final point on the impact of securities fraud law on the 
disclosure underproduction concern is underscored by the reali-
ties of practice today. Wall Street lawyers frequently advise cor-
porate clients that the best legal strategy is to disclose only what 
is mandated by law, as there is often legal uncertainty regarding 
what statements can be pursued as misleading under securities 
fraud law and little upside for the company itself from disclosing 
more than that which is required.89 Commentators have echoed 
 
 87 See A. C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The 
Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2007–2008 Cato S Ct Rev at 227 
(cited in note 19) (noting that “[the] possibility of extracting multimillion dollar settle-
ments from strike suits has driven post-Basic efforts to rein in securities class actions”). 
See also Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the 
Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ’33 and ’34 Act Claims, 76 Wash 
U L Q 537, 552–54 (1998) (describing pre–Private Securities Litigation Reform Act prac-
tices cited by proponents of that Act). 
 88 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub L No 104-67, 
109 Stat 737, codified in various sections of Title 15, is evidence Congress believed the 
system created these troubling settlement incentives. For a discussion of these problems 
and the impact of the PSLRA, see generally Stephen J. Choi and Robert B. Thompson, 
Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes during the First Decade after the PSLRA, 
106 Colum L Rev 1489 (2006); James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, and Dana Kiku, Does 
the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 
106 Colum L Rev 1587 (2006). 
 89 See, for example, Practical Guidance for Living with Regulation FD (WilmerHale, 
Sept 1, 2000), archived at http://perma.cc/2A7S-JESW: 
Follow a “no comment” policy which prohibits the company from responding to 
inquiries or commenting upon rumors concerning prospective developments or 
transactions, such as acquisitions. Adherence to this policy requires that the 
company respond with a statement to the effect that it is the company’s policy 
not to comment upon or respond to such inquiry or rumor. A statement that the 
company does not know of any basis for such a rumor, or is not aware of any 
pending transaction, is not consistent with this policy and, if inaccurate, could 
subject the company to liability. 
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this view, noting the perverse disclosure incentives to which it 
leads.90 
For the corporate agents who retain counsel on behalf of the 
firm, the personal cost-benefit ratio is often even worse than the 
firm-level one that leads to this sheepish disclosure advice and 
the accompanying “neither confirm nor deny” corporate approach. 
There is thus a widely held view among the securities bar that 
many mandatory disclosure requirements designed to be floors 
become ceilings. A leading commentator has summed up these 
disconcerting realities, essentially describing the securities laws 
centered on the disclosure regime as antidisclosure laws.91 
B. Overinclusive Fraud Class Actions 
The flaw of the securities fraud law regime arises due to prob-
lems with its implied private enforcement mechanism under 
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. For decades, that mechanism has allowed 
misstatement suits with class sizes that have ballooned in a 
manner that makes them susceptible to critique. To some, they 
present an altogether negative cost-benefit picture.92 But even 
those who think the current system is justified on a cost-benefit 
basis nevertheless recognize that there are almost surely more 
efficient ways of achieving the benefits.93 In fact, it is almost uni-
versally thought that these suits can be tailored in a way that 
 
 90 See, for example, Donald C. Langevoort, From Texas Gulf Sulphur to Chiarella: 
A Tale of Two Duties (CLS Blue Sky Blog, Jan 8, 2018), archived at 
http://perma.cc/QJ6A-WFKV: 
The law of corporate disclosure promptly went adrift [after the Second Circuit’s 
decision in SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F2d 833 (2d Cir 1968) (en banc)], 
making concealment cases turn on silly distinctions so that true silence about 
even the most material facts is rewarded with legal absolution, while saying a 
bit too much about the subject triggers large potential liability. 
See also Kitch, 61 Brooklyn L Rev at 770–72 (cited in note 85). 
 91 See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va L Rev 1453, 1467 (1997) 
(“In general, there is substantial evidence that the mandatory disclosure system does not 
produce information.”). See also Mahoney, Wasting a Crisis at 38 (cited in note 72) 
(“[A]lthough described as a ‘full disclosure’ statute, the Securities Act as initially enacted 
was at least as much a secrecy statute.”). 
 92 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance under Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act, 69 Bus Law 307, 309 (2014) (stating that securities fraud class action liti-
gation has generated “significant controversy” and that “[c]ritics respond that these same 
lawsuits fail to promote either deterrence or compensation, and that they impose costs in 
excess of benefits”). 
 93 See, for example, Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations 
When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 Wisc L Rev 297, 320–21 (describing a proposed “trans-
formation” of the civil liability imposed on issuers that would eliminate overenforcement). 
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would present much more bang for their buck. And the issue of 
how to address this flaw has thus been one of the most prominent 
issues in the field for some time now—if not the most prominent 
altogether.94 
The problem is rooted in the federal court approach to reli-
ance in these suits. Reliance is a core element of a traditional com-
mon law claim targeting a deceitful representation: for one to be 
liable for using a false or misleading statement to induce another 
into some detrimental action, the latter must have relied on the 
former’s statement.95 But for decades now, federal courts have 
held that actual reliance on the federal, securities-specific version 
of those common law claims embodied in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
need not be pleaded in the complaint or proven at trial. Instead, 
all plaintiffs receive a presumption of reliance, so long as they can 
show that the security they purchased96 traded in an information-
ally efficient market.97 In this type of market, material state-
ments—by definition—move market prices, meaning that false or 
misleading ones will generally distort the price.98 The presump-
tion is thus referred to as the fraud-on-the-market presumption 
(the “FOTM presumption”), as it is the misrepresentation’s im-
pact on the market price that is held front and center. It is this 
presumption (specifically, the floodgates it opens for market par-
ticipants to join a plaintiff class) that results in these securities 
fraud suits having a far lower benefit-to-cost ratio than they oth-
erwise might. 
 
 94 See text accompanying notes 162–64. 
 95 See List v Fashion Park, Inc, 340 F2d 457, 462 (2d Cir 1965) (“[T]he test of ‘reli-
ance’ is whether ‘the misrepresentation is a substantial factor in determining the course 
of conduct which results in [the recipient’s] loss.’”), quoting Restatement (First) of Torts 
§ 546 (1938). 
 96 For ease of exposition, and consistent with the vast majority of real-world public-
company misstatement cases, we use only examples involving purchases that take place 
after a material misrepresentation has been made. Consequently, only those who pur-
chased securities will be considered in the text even though many cases center on negative 
misrepresentations and sellers. 
 97 The Supreme Court endorsed this thinking in Basic Inc v Levinson, which held 
that plaintiffs in these suits did not have to show individual reliance on alleged misrepre-
sentations in order to proceed under the anti-fraud laws and instead were entitled to the 
presumption that they had satisfied the reliance requirement. 485 US 224, 245–47 (1988). 
See also Halliburton Co v Erica P. John Fund, Inc, 134 S Ct 2398, 2414 (2014). 
 98 See Basic, 485 US at 249–50 (adopting the TSC Industries, Inc v Northway, Inc, 
425 US 438 (1976), standard in the Section 10(b) context and holding that a fact is material 
if a reasonable investor would consider it important in deciding whether to buy or sell). 
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To see why, think about the two main benefits of private se-
curities fraud suits: victim compensation and perpetrator deter-
rence.99 With respect to the former, it is thought that without the 
presumption of reliance there is not enough commonality among 
the plaintiffs to allow for aggregation under Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The inquiry into whether or not 
any given plaintiff actually relied on the misstatement is too in-
dividualistic.100 The class action vehicle is thus unavailable in 
these suits so long as actual reliance is required.101 But when re-
liance is not required thanks to the FOTM presumption, the class 
action vehicle is available to aggregate claims that would be too 
small to bring individually. 
This judicial creation no doubt helps real victims receive real 
compensation for real losses caused by real fraud. Critically, it 
facilitates viable suits for investors who actually relied on corpo-
rate misstatements in making their purchasing decisions. 
But a natural consequence of this doctrine is that once a lead 
plaintiff shows that the security traded in an efficient market, 
any investor who bought at the inflated market price can join the 
class of aggrieved individuals. And much of the universe of the 
investing community that buys stock during any substantial pe-
riod does so for reasons that have nothing to do to with the false 
or misleading statement at issue. Instead, they are buying based 
on other information—or for extra-informational purposes alto-
gether (such as mere portfolio accumulation or diversification rea-
sons102). For that reason, nothing about the statement or price 
caused them to enter into the transaction; they would have 
bought even if the misstatement had never been made—and even 
if the price were far higher. But to the extent they have bought at 
an inflated price after a corporate misstatement, they too can join 
the class. 
To be sure, in this situation, portfolio investors who pur-
chased the stock would have paid more for it as a result of the 
 
 99 See Christopher R. Leslie, Comment, Den of Inequity: The Case for Equitable 
Doctrines in Rule 10b-5 Cases, 81 Cal L Rev 1587, 1613 (1993) (noting the two main goals 
of these actions). 
 100 See Basic, 485 US at 230 (recognizing that “without the presumption it would be 
impractical to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)”); id at 242 
(“Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff 
class effectively would have prevented respondents from proceeding with a class action, 
since individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common ones.”). 
 101 See id at 242. 
 102 See note 14 and accompanying text. 
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misstatement and its impact on the stock’s market price. But ex 
ante, these “fraud victims” were just as likely to sell stock of com-
panies with misrepresentation-based inflated prices during the 
inflationary window as they were to buy it. And no law requires 
them to disgorge their gains based on sales at inflated prices. Con-
sequently, from a trading perspective for these investors, so long 
as the company and its insiders are not selling in the market 
based on their knowledge of the misrepresentation, the prospect 
of a misrepresentation that inflates price is just as likely to be 
good as bad. Yet the FOTM presumption allows the investors into 
the private-damages litigation every time they purchase a stock 
at a price that is inflated by a corporate misrepresentation. It fol-
lows that allowing legions of traders from these ranks to join a 
plaintiff class in this manner leads to overcompensation.103 
These overcompensating securities fraud class actions are 
not free. In fact, the hefty resources they suck up are well docu-
mented.104 Mostly, these scarce resources end up being drained 
from firm coffers in the form of lost opportunities due to manage-
ment and employee distraction, legal fees, and the settlement 
amount itself.105 Still more comes at the expense of the judicial 
system, including the opportunity costs of everyone from judges 
to stenographers. As welcome as fees might be to lawyers and the 
legislators they support, these fees eat up significant social re-
sources relative to whatever gain they provide to actual victims 
of securities fraud.106 
For these reasons, at least from a victim compensation per-
spective, there has been practically universal resistance to 
FOTM suits.107 That conclusion holds even if the suits do serve 
an important compensatory function with respect to one group 
 
 103 Since 1996, over thirty-five thousand defendants have been sued, with the settle-
ments totaling over $95 billion. See Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, Box Scores or Key 
Statistics from 1996 to YTD (Stanford Law School), archived at http://perma.cc/E9AS-M5JL. 
 104 See id. 
 105 Even plaintiff-side legal fees are generally borne by the firm, whether directly as 
part of the settlement costs or indirectly in the form of an increased cost of capital attribut-
able to discounting of company value in the market. 
 106 One particular cost of this overinclusiveness bears special mention: disclosure un-
derproduction. With larger class actions, there are larger damages on the line—thereby 
exacerbating the problem of excessive secrecy among corporate executives. See Part II.A.2. 
 107 See, for example, Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation 
*79, (Nov 30, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/Y23F-MD8H (“[C]ontemporary securities 
class action litigation is still suffering from a problem of circularity. [Securities class ac-
tion] recovery is largely paid by diversified shareholders to diversified shareholders and 
thus represents a pocket shifting wealth transfer that compensates no one in any mean-
ingful sense and incurs substantial wasteful transaction costs in the process.”). 
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of investors (that composed of information-based traders who ac-
tually relied on the misrepresentation, but who would not have 
had an economically viable path toward recovery absent the 
FOTM presumption). 
Still, all of these costs may be worth spending if they result 
in other social benefits in addition to whatever victim compensa-
tion ones they provide. But there is only one other main aim of 
the suits to consider—deterrence108—and here too the story isn’t 
pretty. 
On this front, securities fraud law aims to limit fraud to its 
optimal level: spending an additional dollar on the deterrence of 
misrepresentations only when the corresponding social gain from 
the reduction in misrepresentations is worth at least the same 
amount. There are considerable social benefits to having fraud 
suits. Not least among them is that the suits make disclosures 
credible and thus improve capital allocation and corporate gov-
ernance.109 We, like all other securities law scholars we know, are 
in favor of strict anti-fraud rules. 
But here too the size of the typical plaintiff class, rooted in 
the FOTM presumption, creates damages from fraud that no 
doubt dwarf the deterrence gains it generates.110 To see just how 
out of whack these class sizes are with their deterrence function, 
it is important to remember that disclosure decisions are made by 
individuals (not firms) and that these individuals’ incentives are 
what the law is trying to change through the fraud suits. For ex-
ample, imagine that the CEO and other insiders lied to inflate the 
company’s market value and that they actually did so not just to 
inflate the stock price, but also to earn trading profits by selling 
stock for gains of $20 million before the truth is revealed weeks 
 
 108 See Leslie, Comment, 81 Cal L Rev at 1613 (cited in note 99) (“Deterrence prevents 
fraud and is thus the primary goal of Rule 10b-5 and other securities fraud laws. When 
deterrence fails, the focus shifts to compensating victims and disgorging ill-gotten gains 
from wrongdoers.”). 
 109 See notes 6–7. 
 110 See Pritchard, 2007–2008 Cato S Ct Rev at 223–25 (cited in note 19) (describing 
how the measure of damages typically used in such cases “exaggerates the social harm” 
caused by the fraud); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class 
Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 Va L Rev 925, 947 (1999) (argu-
ing that, because the law favors compensation over deterrence, “securities class actions 
are an expensive way to reduce the social costs of fraud on the market”); Fox, 109 Colum 
L Rev at 246–48 (cited in note 7) (“The rise of the fraud-on-the-market class action [ ] 
created strong new incentives for an issuer to comply with its periodic disclosure obliga-
tions. . . . There is a widespread feeling, however, that the incentives come at great social 
expense.”). 
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or even months later. Putting aside other benefits and costs 
(namely, whatever indirect benefits the executives would receive 
from the higher stock price and indirect costs they would incur 
from the revelation of the truth), if the probability of detection is 
50 percent, then, even if we assumed risk neutrality on behalf of 
the insiders, they as a group would be deterred by personal dam-
ages of only $40 million plus a dollar. Those damages alone would 
result in negative expected gains from their planned conduct. Yet 
under these facts, a 10b-5 class action could easily generate hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in damages or more as traders pur-
chased and sold the stock in the market during the inflationary 
period.111 
Ultimately, these types of potential damages offer questiona-
ble marginal returns in terms of deterrence. The threat of an ad-
ditional $200 million in damages and litigation costs for a 
medium-sized public company would likely do little more to deter 
fraud than the threat of the initial $100 million. This conclusion 
is bolstered by thinking about the career implications of sanctions 
for executives and the fact that the truth can generally be sup-
pressed for only so long before the day of corporate reckoning. The 
benefit-to-cost ratio relating to additional millions or even tens of 
millions in damages generated by the FOTM presumption is 
therefore likely quite low. The same principles apply—albeit with 
different numbers—to smaller and larger firms that typically 
have, respectively, smaller and larger trading volume and market 
capitalizations. 
Stepping back, the almost universal view that these suits 
could be tailored to produce a far higher benefit-to-cost ratio is 
easy enough to see. That statement holds even when that ratio 
takes into consideration FOTM suits’ victim-compensation bene-
fits, which, as explained above, are limited in scope and come with 
all of the aforementioned costs. 
  
 
 111 See note 119 and accompanying text. 
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C. Underprosecution of Illegal Trading and Tipping by 
Executives 
Lastly, the restriction on insider trading is thought to be 
suboptimally enforced. In fact, there is evidence that illegal trad-
ing and tipping by those with informational advantages based on 
their position inside public companies remains rampant.112 
Either of the two main bars on insider trading could be used 
to stop corporate management and directors from trading (and 
tipping) in their own firm’s stock based on material, nonpublic 
information.113 However, consistent with this story of widespread 
trading by actual corporate insiders, classical insider trading ap-
pears to have taken a back seat to misappropriation insider trad-
ing, with the lion’s share of the government’s efforts at cracking 
down on improper trading appearing to fall on outsiders at hedge 
funds who misappropriate information from any one of a variety 
of sources.114 To the extent that focus has in fact shifted in this 
way, there may be much room for illegal trading by actual corpo-
rate insiders.115 
There’s a troubling political economy embodied in this ap-
proach of, on the one hand, allowing America’s corporate execu-
tives more breathing room while, on the other, targeting hedge-
fund managers and the henchmen those investors deploy to do 
their dirty work. The most prominent debate in the corporate gov-
ernance arena today is whether the investment activity of activist 
hedge funds disrupts the execution of long-term corporate strate-
gies or whether this activity actually improves corporate perfor-
 
 112 See, for example, M. Todd Henderson, Insider Trading and CEO Pay, 64 Vand L 
Rev 505, 541–42 (2011) (showing large and significant abnormal returns for insiders using 
so-called Rule 10b5-1 trading plans); Alma Cohen, Robert J. Jackson Jr, and Joshua R. 
Mitts, The 8-K Trading Gap *30–31 (Columbia Center for Law and Economic Studies 
Working Paper No 524, Sept 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7GE7-UJPM 
(demonstrating the existence of increased trading by corporate executives in the days be-
fore their firms release 8-K disclosures on significant firm events, with buying (selling) far 
more often than not coming before the good (bad) news). 
 113 See Part I.C. 
 114 See M. Todd Henderson, The Changing Demand for Insider Trading Regulation, 
in Bainbridge, ed, Research Handbook 230, 242–44 (cited in note 44) (noting the move from 
classical insider trading to the misappropriation theory and an increase in prosecutions of 
outsiders, such as hedge funds, over the past several decades). 
 115 See Henderson, 64 Vand L Rev at 526–37 (cited in note 112) (examining empirical 
evidence suggesting a connection between the lack of insider trading prosecution and trad-
ing by true insiders). 
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mance by reining in massive agency costs associated with the sep-
aration of ownership and control in public companies.116 You can 
guess where corporate executives come down on this issue.117 And 
although hedge funds have a good deal of campaign finance power 
beyond even select New York and California congressional dis-
tricts,118 the political influence and resources of the types of funds 
usually targeted by the government pale in comparison to those 
of America’s CEOs, who stand at the helms of ships that together 
make up a $32 trillion armada.119 Although there is some inter-
section between fund and executive control of the fleet, it is clear 
that America’s top executives wield wealth and power that is 
enormous relative to even that in the hands of hedge fund 
managers.120 Accordingly, when we see strong insider trading en-
forcement under the misappropriation theory against fund man-
agers by the executive branch yet indications of weak enforce-
ment against C-suite executives, we further worry about 
suboptimal levels of enforcement, at least with respect to the latter. 
Further, there are other forces at play behind this apparently 
lax effort to crack down on executives trading on nonpublic infor-
mation. Even though they are disproportionately registered in a 
select few jurisdictions and trading on exchanges associated with 
similarly circumscribed geographical areas, America’s public 
 
 116 Compare Stephen M. Bainbridge, Preserving Director Primacy by Managing 
Shareholder Interventions *11–14 (UCLA Law-Econ Research Paper No 13-09, Aug 27, 
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/Z8XM-3Y58 (discussing various studies on the topic and 
noting that “one ought to be especially dubious of hedge fund interventions . . . aimed at 
changing corporate business strategy”), with Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei 
Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 Colum L Rev 1085, 1117–20 
(2015) (finding that the claim that “activist interventions are followed by declines in long-
term operating performance” is “not supported by the data”). 
 117 For notable articles supporting their view in addition to Bainbridge, cited in note 
116, see generally K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale, and Simone M. Sepe, 
Commitment and Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 110 Nw U L Rev 727 (2016); 
Leo E. Strine Jr, Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on 
Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 116 Yale L J 1870 
(2017); Martin Lipton and Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: 
The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U Chi L Rev 187 (1991). 
 118 For more detail on campaign contributions by the hedge fund industry, see Center 
for Responsive Politics, Hedge Funds (OpenSecrets.org, Mar 12, 2018), archived at 
http://perma.cc/4UFC-WT9V. 
 119 Public companies in the United States are now worth an aggregate of more than 
$32 trillion. See Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (Current US$) 
(World Bank, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/5R87-5GAQ. 
 120 See Henderson, The Changing Demand for Insider Trading Regulation at 234–36 
(cited in note 114) (noting the change in prosecution and describing the political economy 
of the interplay among traders, CEOs, and the SEC). 
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companies have headquarters dispersed throughout the country. 
Federal prosecutors in most jurisdictions may be reluctant to 
bring criminal charges against the directors and officers of the 
large employers and philanthropists headquartered in their juris-
dictions. To go after them for trading on not-yet-public infor-
mation may be bad for the automobile plant, let alone the local 
opera house. 
Even if they had the will, federal prosecutors and the SEC 
Division of Enforcement attorneys located in New York, 
Washington, or anywhere else in the country face an uphill battle 
in policing classical insider trading on their own given the large 
number of public firms dispersed throughout the nation—each of 
which generally has at least one or two dozen top insiders.121 The 
government has limited resources with which to police the vast 
amounts of trading and tipping by tens of thousands of insiders. 
Consistent with this story, the SEC has brought only about fifty 
insider trading cases per year for over a decade122 despite the 
earlier-cited evidence about the scope of illegal insider trading 
today.123 The result is to leave the primary role in prosecuting in-
sider trading to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Because this 
means the suits will be criminal, not civil, a higher burden of proof 
will apply to the prosecutions, dictating that cases will be harder 
to win—which of course has an effect on charging decisions in the 
first place. It also means that those with a more general focus 
than just securities law will often be making those decisions and 
presenting those cases, even if federal prosecutors in New York and 
select other jurisdictions have many securities-focused lawyers. 
Ultimately, then, the existing insider trading regime, en-
forced by members of an elected branch of government who may 
in many instances be unwilling and/or unable to curb this activity 
that is said to be so socially harmful, reveals the strong possibility 
that illegal trading and tipping by insiders are significantly un-
derprosecuted. Knowing that insider trading often gives rise to 
supernormal profits for executives and that they face a low likeli-
hood of actually getting their mug shots taken, trading by these 
insiders may remain as rampant as the evidence we cite suggests. 
 
 121 For a sense of the aggregate number of corporate board seats at these companies, 
see 2016 Spencer Stuart Board Index *14 (Spencer Stuart, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9NMM-NUQN. 
 122 See Year-by-Year SEC Enforcement Statistics (SEC), archived at 
http://perma.cc/M3SP-8TJG. 
 123 See note 112. 
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That it is these corporate agents themselves who have much 
power over the extent to which their principal (the firm) will 
monitor and report illegal trading by them should underscore the 
concern. That a light-touch approach at the enterprise level al-
lows shareholders to pay their executives less compensation out 
of the company coffers should do the same.124 
* * * 
This Part presents our version of a well-known story revolv-
ing around established facts. Although perhaps an improvement 
over the status quo ante, the mandatory disclosure regime rooted 
in the major New Deal–era securities acts is unlikely to have 
landed on the optimal level of public-company information pro-
duction and sharing. In sum, that regime introduces an overpro-
duction problem while at the same time leaving much to be de-
sired when it comes to addressing the original underproduction 
one. Moreover, one of the two main overlays on the disclosure re-
gime (securities fraud law) facilitates private class actions with 
benefit-to-cost ratios that are almost surely far lower than they 
could be while also exacerbating the disclosure underproduction 
concern. Likewise, an apparent disconcerting lack of enforcement 
against a key group of insider trading perpetrators (actual corpo-
rate insiders) with respect to the other main legal overlay (insider 
trading law) keeps that effort from attaining its goals. The three 
main aspects of modern securities law, along with their key flaws, 
should now be apparent. 
III.  FIXING THE FLAWS WITH A NEW MARKET-BASED APPROACH 
In this penultimate Part, we set forth the specifics of our 
market-based approach to securities law. In a way, our proposal 
is relatively small: we call only for the amendment of an SEC rule 
relating to the precise timing and manner of information releases 
by firms, and a more general attitude change among regulators 
regarding the same. The rule, Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(“Reg FD”), requires the simultaneous release of material public-
company information when it is first revealed beyond the firm, 
and the accompanying regulatory mood is one that strongly en-
courages a more general adherence to a simultaneous-disclosure 
standard.125 Changing this rule (in admittedly core ways) and the 
 
 124 See notes 7 and 28 and accompanying text. 
 125 See notes 127–31 and accompanying text. 
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related regulatory attitudes would allow a well-regulated market 
for early access to public-company information to arise. The im-
pact of this information market could be profound—specifically, 
it could ameliorate each of the fundamental flaws of modern se-
curities law discussed in Part II. We explain why in detail below, 
focusing on these benefits before turning to consider reasonable 
objections to this approach in Part IV. Thus, this Part lays out the 
main benefits of our new market-based approach to securities 
law, while the final one then considers whether that approach 
would in fact further the law’s attempt to improve social welfare 
through securities regulation. 
A. The Approach 
Our basic idea has two pillars: first, permit companies to re-
lease new-to-market information to information consumers at dif-
ferent times; and second, permit those companies to charge those 
consumers in return for the earlier releases. 
Enabling these interconnected changes requires an amend-
ment to Reg FD. Promulgated in 2000, that SEC regulation re-
quires public companies that are disclosing any material infor-
mation to the market to make the information available to all 
potential investors at the same exact time.126 This simultaneous-
dissemination requirement applies to the disclosure of all 
material corporate information—whether or not that disclosure 
was compelled by law in the first place. For these reasons, firms 
must make everything from a mandated formal quarterly 10-Q 
report with earnings information, on the one hand, to a voluntary 
press release on the CEO’s health considered to be material 
(which may or may not be required by the law), on the other, 
available to all members of the public at the exact same time. 
Reg FD is designed to increase fairness for ordinary long-
term investors—and to address closely related concerns for those 
investors’ confidence in the market.127 In the days before Reg FD 
 
 126 See 17 CFR § 243.100(a) (“Whenever . . . [a public firm] discloses any material 
nonpublic information regarding [itself] or its securities . . . [it] shall make public disclo-
sure of that information . . . [s]imultaneously.”); SEC, Selective Disclosure and Insider 
Trading, 65 Fed Reg 51716, 51719 (2000) (“As a whole, the regulation requires that when 
an issuer makes an intentional disclosure of material nonpublic information . . . it must 
do so in a manner that provides general public disclosure, rather than through a selective 
disclosure.”). 
 127 See SEC, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed Reg 72590, 72592 
(1999) (stating that the main goal of Reg FD is to help increase “fundamental fairness to 
all investors”). 
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was implemented, the Commission thought it was unfair that 
firms handed out valuable information through backchannels to 
securities analysts before making that information available to 
everyday investors. The underlying assumption, whether right or 
wrong, is that equal access to new information puts these inves-
tors on an even playing field with sophisticated professionals, 
thereby allowing the former to participate in the market in a 
“fair” way and to have confidence in its integrity.128 
The regulation is also accompanied by a general disdain 
among policymakers, which goes back decades, for unequal access 
to market-moving information.129 It isn’t hard to find examples of 
this regulatory animus toward tiered information release. Three 
prominent recent examples are noteworthy. 
First, the government made parity-of-information arguments 
in the most recent Supreme Court case on the appropriate scope 
of insider trading law. In Salman v United States,130 the govern-
ment focused on “the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to 
take advantage of [inside] information” unavailable to outsid-
ers.131 The Supreme Court rejected those arguments, stating that 
“a tippee is exposed to liability for trading on inside information 
only if the tippee participates in a breach of the tipper’s fiduciary 
duty” and “[t]hus, the disclosure of confidential information with-
out personal benefit is not enough.”132 
Second, in late 2014, academic studies showed that the SEC 
itself (specifically, its Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and 
Retrieval (EDGAR) website) was routinely allowing traders to 
 
 128 In adopting the rule, the SEC emphasized that “[t]he vast majority of [those who 
submitted comment letters in response to the SEC’s Reg FD proposal] consisted of indi-
vidual investors” and that those investors urged the adoption of the regulation because 
nonsimultaneous dissemination of corporate disclosures “places them at a severe disad-
vantage in the market.” 65 Fed Reg at 51717 (cited in note 126). 
 129 The SEC’s march to Reg FD began at least seventeen years prior to its adoption. 
In the seminal Dirks v Securities and Exchange Commission insider trading case, the 
agency argued for a broader insider trading restriction on tipping so that all investors 
would be more likely to have equal access to material public-company information. 463 US 
646 (1982). The Supreme Court rejected those arguments in that case, as it did earlier in 
Chiarella. See Chiarella v United States, 445 US 222, 233 (1980) (“[N]either the Congress 
nor the Commission ever has adopted a parity-of-information rule. Instead the problems 
caused by misuse of market information have been addressed by detailed and sophisti-
cated regulation that recognizes when use of market information may not harm operation 
of the securities markets.”). 
 130 137 S Ct 420 (2016). 
 131 Brief for the United States, Salman v United States, No 15-628, *18 (US filed Aug 
1, 2016) (available on Westlaw at 2016 WL 4088380), quoting Dirks, 463 US at 653–54. 
 132 Salman, 137 S Ct at 427. 
2018] A New Market-Based Approach to Securities Law 1347 
 
gain seconds-early and even minutes-early access to corporate fil-
ings.133 Even though there was no technical violation of Reg FD 
(the rule applies to public companies, not to the SEC), the SEC 
unsurprisingly took immediate aim at the unintentional tiered 
releases,134 noting its commitment “to help ensure that the equity 
markets remain the deepest and fairest in the world.”135 
Third, around the same time, the New York State Attorney 
General (NYSAG) began using state-level fraud law to target 
seconds-early releases of market-moving information by noncor-
porate information producers, such as research universities and 
trade associations.136 Labeling these tiered information releases 
and related market activity “Insider Trading 2.0,” the NYSAG ef-
fectively stopped seconds-early information releases nationwide 
via consent decree alone.137 No firm appears to have been inter-
ested in challenging the merits of these claims despite strong ar-
guments against them.138 
All of these recent examples of opposition among regulators 
to tiered information release occurred at the same time as more 
general skepticism about other examples of uneven information 
release, such as those relating to direct feeds of transaction and 
 
 133 See Robert J. Jackson Jr and Joshua R. Mitts, How the SEC Helps Speedy Traders 
*8–9 (Columbia Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No 501, Nov 6, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/US7C-D4XG. See also Jonathan L. Rogers, Douglas J. 
Skinner, and Sarah L.C. Zechman, Run EDGAR Run: SEC Dissemination in a High-
Frequency World *35–36 (Chicago Booth Paper No 14-36, Jan 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/R4LL-45B9 (finding that certain firms, who “pay for direct access to EDGAR, 
receive filings before they are available on the SEC website more than half of the time”). 
 134 See Scott Patterson, SEC to Close Gap in Filings’ Release—Lawmakers Expressed 
Concern after Studies Showed Rapid-Fire Traders Were Given an Edge on Data, Wall St J 
B1 (Dec 27, 2014). 
 135 Examining Recent Efforts by the SEC and FINRA in Aiding the Functioning and 
Stability of the Equity Markets, and Identifying Key Issues under Consideration to Reduce 
Market Complexity, Increase Operational Stability, and Promote Efficiency, Competition, 
and Capital Formation, 114th Cong, 2d Sess 43 (2016) (Letter from SEC Chair Mary Jo 
White to Senators Johnson and Crapo, Dec 23, 2014). 
 136 See A.G. Schneiderman Announces Marketwired Agreement to End Sales of News 
Feeds to High-Frequency Traders (NYSAG, Mar 19, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9XKS-VZ6C; A.G. Schneiderman Secures Agreement by Thomson Reuters 
to Stop Offering Early Access to Market-Moving Information (NYSAG, July 8, 2013), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/DB22-WL9L. 
 137 See Haeberle and Henderson, 101 Cornell L Rev at 1375–76, 1391–92 (cited in 
note 13). See also A.G. Schneiderman Announces Marketwired Agreement (cited in note 
136) (discussing former Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman’s “efforts to end Insider 
Trading 2.0”). 
 138 See Haeberle and Henderson, 101 Cornell L Rev at 1430 (cited in note 13) (ex-
plaining why the underlying conduct that the NYSAG stopped was likely desirable from a 
public policy perspective). 
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quote information from trading platforms to high-speed traders 
and “colocation” arrangements139 by those traders.140 
The tiered information releases involving payment for prem-
ier access that we contemplate would thus require both changes 
to Reg FD as well as a more general reformation in regulatory 
attitude regarding tiered information revelation. Notably, how-
ever, these releases would not require any change to insider 
trading law.141 
Without Reg FD’s simultaneity requirement and this related 
regulatory mood, yet with existing insider trading law operating 
in full force, firms could offer to sell early access to information 
that must—under our proposal,142 if not existing law—soon be 
made available to all. For example, if a firm wanted to release 
new material information to the public at noon, it would be per-
mitted to sell private access to the news seconds, minutes, or even 
hours prior to noon—so long as the firm did so openly and on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, that is, by making it available to anyone 
willing to pay the market price for it. 
The immediate effect of this reform would be to unleash 
forces of information supply and demand that are now suppressed 
by the law. We detailed this now-suppressed supply and demand 
for early access to corporate information in other work.143 More 
specifically, we focused on the demand that information traders, 
noise traders, and even those beyond securities markets would 
have if the law permitted the purchase and sale of early-access 
disclosure products today.144 We then also detailed the supply of 
such products that this demand would trigger.145 
With this supply and demand able to interact out in the open, 
a market for corporate information would form. Our recent work 
carefully considers the likely broad contours of this market, 
providing an example of such a market by focusing on one in 
which there are at least two early releases before the ultimate 
 
 139 “Colocation” in this context refers to the situation in which market participants 
pay trading platforms for the right to place their servers next to the trading platforms’ 
servers, thereby reducing the time it takes for communications to travel between the two. 
 140 See, for example, SEC, Release No. 34-61358, Concept Release on Equity Market 
Structure 45–46, 58 (2010) (discussing both the direct-feed and colocation issues). 
 141 We discuss why that is so in the context of addressing general objections to our 
approach in Part IV.A.1. 
 142 See text accompanying notes 11–13 (discussing our full-release requirement); 
notes 169–75 and accompanying text (same). 
 143 See Haeberle and Henderson, 35 Yale J Reg 401–10 (cited in note 26). 
 144 See id at 401–08. 
 145 See id 409–10. 
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public release (one initial release to high-speed traders, followed 
by a second one to fundamental-value traders and more general 
users of corporate information seconds later, and then a full pub-
lic release perhaps a couple of hours later).146 But as we make 
clear in that same work, ultimately only the market itself can pro-
vide us with those exact contours.147 
Although important to note generally, the precise early-
access supply and demand are unimportant here. The same can 
be said with respect to the exact contours of this market. What is 
important, however, is to recognize our new market-based ap-
proach to securities law: to set these market forces free in this 
type of transparent information market, thereby allowing those 
forces and that market to play the leading role in ameliorating 
the fundamental flaws of this area of law in the ways we describe 
next. 
B. Potential to Ameliorate the Flaws 
Reforming the law to allow the information market discussed 
above could benefit securities law as a whole by ameliorating each 
of the fundamental flaws detailed earlier.148 
1. Effect on securities disclosure law. 
The market for corporate information could lead to increases 
in the production of information where there is too little today, all 
the while leading to a taming of the same where there is now too 
much. 
a)  Effect on the undersupply of corporate information. At 
the threshold, allowing bargaining between the public companies 
that produce disclosures and the consumers who actually use 
them is a straightforward remedy for the disclosure underproduc-
tion problem. We made this assertion and explained our reason-
ing in great detail in our recent article.149 That work focused en-
tirely on the claim we repeat here: that firms would provide more 
corporate information more frequently in better formats if they 
could earn revenue in return for it thanks to a market for tiered 
access to corporate information.  
 
 146 See id at 414–16. 
 147 See Haeberle and Henderson, 35 Yale J Reg at 414–16 (cited in note 26). 
 148 See Part II. 
 149 For a detailed description of our argument, see Haeberle and Henderson, 35 Yale 
J Reg at 416–25 (cited in note 26). 
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Still, it is important to point out the connection between our 
reforms and these improvements. Reg FD and accompanying reg-
ulatory attitudes prevent such a market from arising.150 But they 
also prevent a more general market for corporate information 
from arising. Today, firms cannot earn revenue in return for en-
hanced disclosure products. This is because no information con-
sumer would pay for such enhancements knowing that the en-
hanced product must be delivered to all (including the 
competition) at the exact same time thanks to Reg FD and the 
related general regulatory mood.151 Large groups of information 
consumers could, at least in theory, get together to pay firms to 
provide more information sooner, in better formats. But collective 
action among, for example, information-trading hedge funds on 
this front is unlikely.152 That is especially true because these trad-
ers have more room to earn trading profits when the rest of the 
market is in the dark. In that situation, they are able to generate 
their own information and trade on it profitably in an under-the-
radar fashion. If traders instead got together with the competition 
to induce firms to sell enhanced informational products, then 
they, their friendly competition, and the entire market more gen-
erally would all receive the information at the same time. After 
all, Reg FD and the related attitudes prevent any delay between 
initial and public disclosure. The end result would be markedly 
smaller opportunities for information-based trading profits. 
A more specific example helps make these points clear. Take 
risk factors for the business that must be disclosed in 10-K annual 
reports today. Under the law as it stands, it is highly unlikely 
that a hedge fund would pay a public company for additional in-
formation about, for example, the company’s not-yet-disclosed 
view on the probability and magnitude of the harm associated 
with a labor strike at one of its key suppliers. For the fund, mys-
tery with respect to this information would likely provide more 
room for research and informed analysis—and ultimately serious 
profits from quiet piecemeal trading over a sustained period. 
Highlighting the information would likely do the opposite, pre-
cluding profitable investing based on the information. This is es-
pecially true because all competing hedge funds would get the in-
formation at the same exact time and because the market more 
generally would know of the new information. 
 
 150 See notes 128–43 and accompanying text. 
 151 See Haeberle and Henderson, 35 Yale J Reg at 399–400 (cited in note 26). 
 152 See id at 406. 
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A reformation in the law to allow for a tiered-access market 
changes this status quo in a way that allows firms to earn revenue 
in return for sharing improved disclosure. For that reason, it pro-
vides firms with an incentive to generate and share more valuable 
content, with greater frequency, in better formats—all to meet in-
formation consumer demand. And because we require the full 
public release of any enhanced disclosure product within a rela-
tively short timeframe,153 the information would be made availa-
ble to all soon enough, dictating an improvement to public disclo-
sure and not just to the earlier-released selective disclosure. 
In sum, the reforms to allow our tiered-access market would 
bring market forces to the world of corporate disclosure, and those 
market forces would provide firms with a revenue incentive to 
produce better quality disclosure for the actual users of public-
company information. 
b)  The oversupply of public-company information. The 
same basic logic also applies to the tailoring of disclosure where 
too much is provided today. Here, the proposed information mar-
ket would tell regulators much about the value of existing disclo-
sure requirements. They could then use that information to better 
tailor the disclosure regime. 
In our market, companies would earn revenue in return for 
providing information to traders and others. But that is only the 
case if those users of corporate information in fact value early ac-
cess to the information at issue. When traders and more general 
information consumers do not value information, they will not 
pay for early access to it. For that reason, the market will not add 
a revenue incentive to include that information. But the firms will 
still share that information in the way they must today, as the 
law requires it. 
How then would the market help identify areas of infor-
mation underproduction? Firms, as influenced by actual users of 
their information, could use the market to convey their views on 
the value of the disclosure requirement at issue. They could do so 
by leaving the information at issue (for example, executive-to-
median-worker pay ratio) out of their enhanced products that 
they release on a tiered basis before making it available to all, 
continuing to disclose it to the public in only their full public 
release of that information as they do today. To the extent such 
 
 153 See text accompanying notes 11–13, 168–74. In Part IV.A, we discuss the implica-
tions of this full-disclosure requirement for ordinary investors. 
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exclusions of specific items of required information in the selec-
tive disclosures appear across firms, a strong signal as to the lack 
of information consumer value—and thus often the lack of overall 
value—would be present.154 
Of course, if regulators listened to this signal, firms could at-
tempt to game the system by omitting key information from early-
release products (for example, management discussion and 
analysis of the firm’s financial condition) and disclosing it only in 
the same way in which it is disclosed today. But regulators would 
have a variety of clues that would help them identify such 
gaming. For one thing, many firms would have to coordinate on 
such omissions. This is because only signals as to the lack of value 
of a disclosure requirement across a number of firms would be 
valuable. For another, event studies by SEC and academic and 
professional economists could help regulators determine when 
there is information of value being released only in this way. This 
is especially true in the world we envision, as market movements 
should happen immediately after material information is first re-
leased.155 Price movements in the market that begin immediately 
after the full public disclosure, and not earlier during the tiered 
information-release period, would therefore help reveal instances 
in which firms were holding material information out from the 
early-access market. Information consumers could aid those stud-
ies by informing regulators of information they want in the early-
access market that is not being provided in that market. 
Still, there is an additional, even more important reason for 
concluding that such gaming would not be problematic. Our 
changes to the securities fraud regime provide firms with power-
ful incentives to include all material information in early-release 
products. This point becomes clearer after the next Section, where 
we discuss how we envision the information market changing se-
curities fraud law. But it is sufficient to say here that those 
changes result in a situation in which firms would lose out on 
notable cost savings if they failed to disclose material information 
in the early-access market. 
 
 154 The converse is also true: inclusion of required disclosure information in early-
release products could provide the basis for an inference that the requirement correctly 
identifies material information. This could be helpful in proving materiality in securities 
fraud litigation, including those relating to the “fraud” that is said to occur in classical and 
misappropriation insider trading. 
 155 See note 14 and accompanying text. 
2018] A New Market-Based Approach to Securities Law 1353 
 
Stepping back, it becomes clear that market feedback indi-
cating a lack of interest in information would often help firms 
hone their early-release products. Over time, information that is 
irrelevant to information consumers would likely fall out of early-
release products. The SEC and Congress could then look to those 
products for signals as to what information consumers do and do 
not value. When they see information that must be disclosed pur-
suant to a mandatory disclosure requirement being released only 
in public disclosures and not in any early-release product, the reg-
ulators should question the value of the information to infor-
mation consumers—and therefore the overall value of the re-
quirement itself. 
2. Effect on securities fraud law. 
The information market could also improve securities fraud 
litigation. Here, the contribution of the market comes in the form 
of its potential as a powerful reference point for courts seeking to 
reduce the problematic breadth of private securities litigation.156 
A market for public-company information gives courts a far 
better way of identifying the appropriate class members in pri-
vate 10(b) and 10b-5 suits. In determining who gets a presump-
tion of reliance, courts could look to who participated in the infor-
mation market and then traded during the inflationary period 
rather than just the latter, as they do today. In other words, with 
such a market in operation, courts could replace the FOTM pre-
sumption with a “Participated in the Information Market” (PIM) 
one. Under this new reliance presumption, anyone who purchased 
early-access rights to a corporate disclosure that included a false 
or misleading statement could join a class action suit against the 
corporate fraudsters—so long as, like today, they also purchased 
the stock while its price was still inflated by the statement. 
From the victim-compensation perspective, this novel reli-
ance presumption is eminently more reasonable than the existing 
one. (It is likewise more reasonable than one that dumps the baby 
out with the bath water, such as reforms in favor of scrapping 
private suits altogether or moving to a pure arbitration setting 
for private actions.) Assuming reliance when a market partici-
pant purchases early access to a disclosure, and then transacts 
 
 156 We focus on use of the information market by courts, as they implemented the 
FOTM presumption in the first place. But there is of course much room for Congress or 
the SEC to act in this area. 
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just after it, captures the information traders who were detrimen-
tally induced into transacting by the fraudulent statement. That 
these investors relied on the information and were induced to act 
based on it is evidenced by their participation in the information 
market and subsequent trading. 
Assuming a sufficiently robust information market,157 those 
who purchased early access to the information and then traded 
during the inflationary period would have enough commonality to 
form a class and avail themselves of the economies of scale asso-
ciated with it—economies thought to be necessary for private lit-
igation to work.158 At the same time, use of the market in this way 
would restrict compensation of nonvictims. Perhaps most im-
portantly, indexing portfolio traders—who are not really victims 
of this type of fraud159—would in all likelihood be nicely sorted out 
from the class. Those traders have little to no reason to pay for 
corporate information and would therefore generally not partici-
pate in an early-access market before trading. For that reason, 
they would generally be unable to avail themselves of our new 
reliance presumption. 
Crucially, this reform would still likely leave in place dam-
ages sufficient to deter corporate misstatements in significant 
ways, thereby achieving enough in terms of this second aim of 
these suits and doing so at a far lower cost. When new disclosures 
are made today, a flurry of activity ensues in the marketplace. 
The same would likely be true with respect to the post–early-
release trading environment.160 It follows that there would likely 
be enough shares purchased by traders who participated in the 
information market for the potential damages to provide serious 
levels of deterrence. There is more to say about firms’ inability to 
avail themselves of this benefit to the extent the relevant state-
ment appears only in simultaneously disseminated disclosure.161 
But for now, it is clear enough that our PIM presumption provides 
an intriguing device for improvement on the status quo. 
 
 157 We discuss this caveat in more detail in Parts IV.B.1–2 in the context of addressing 
objections and laying out a framework for further debate. 
 158 See Part II.B. 
 159 See Part II.B. 
 160 See Hu, Pan, and Wang, 126 J Fin Econ at 407–08 (cited in note 14) (showing 
tenfold increase in the volume of the E-mini S&P 500 futures contract in the milliseconds 
after the seconds-early release of a key economic indicator before the NYSAG put an end 
to the practice). See also notes 136–39 and accompanying text. 
 161 See Part IV.B.1. 
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Moreover, eliminating the need for the judicially invented 
FOTM reliance rule would deliver significant administrability 
benefits and cost savings. The FOTM presumption puts district 
courts in a tough spot: they have to make determinations about 
whether the market for a particular stock is efficient or not—a 
task nonspecialist courts and their judges are generally ill-
equipped to complete. And they must do all that at the motion to 
dismiss phase, before a record has been fully established. This is 
because the nature of securities fraud cases (namely, the massive 
potential for damages noted above and the attendant litigation 
costs) has necessitated courts collapsing the entire inquiry into 
that stage. And the Supreme Court has recently increased what 
district courts must do at this stage because it has refined the 
FOTM theory to include a potential defense of market ineffi-
ciency, which district courts are also required to consider at the 
class certification stage.162 The result is a kind of dystopian judi-
cial proceeding in which the plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense 
lawyers argue their entire case at a point in the litigation when 
little is known, focusing on things like market efficiency, and real 
issues about the appropriate scope of the litigation to serve its 
compensation and deterrence ends are largely ignored. 
The significance of this upside of our market-based approach 
should not be underestimated. The seriousness and scope of the 
issue with respect to the selection of an appropriate class for se-
curities fraud suits have led to Basic Inc v Levinson’s163 FOTM 
presumption of reliance being one of the single most controversial 
aspects of the US legal system over recent decades. Several 
Supreme Court cases,164 hundreds of lower court opinions, a major 
federal statute (the PSLRA165), and about eighteen hundred law 
review articles have wrestled with the implications of the FOTM 
theory. Few, other than the lawyers and professional service pro-
viders who receive the primary benefits of class settlements to-
day, see the current system as anywhere close to optimal. Moving 
 
 162 See Halliburton Co v Erica P. John Fund, Inc, 134 S Ct 2398, 2414 (2014) 
(“Halliburton II”) (allowing defendants to rebut the reliance presumption at the class cer-
tification stage by proving the misrepresentation(s) at issue did not affect the stock price). 
 163 485 US 224 (1988). 
 164 The most recent review of the FOTM presumption came in 2014. See Halliburton 
II, 134 S Ct at 2411–13. 
 165 The change in law relating to the reliance presumption would be consistent with 
the spirit of the PSLRA—especially its move toward having the shareholders with the 
most at stake in the litigation steer it. See note 88. 
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the needle toward a better system for investors and other corpo-
rate stakeholders (but not the outside lawyers, auditors, and 
event-study economists) by any material amount would be a ma-
jor win for society. 
3. Effect on insider trading law. 
Lastly, the proposed information market can also help ad-
dress the underenforcement of illegal trading and tipping by cor-
porate executives. Today, executives, the firm itself, and the 
firm’s large shareholders have incentives to turn a blind eye 
toward illegal trading by the former.166 The information market 
we propose would alter the mix of incentives for each of these cor-
porate stakeholders to make them more likely to favor more ro-
bust policing of insider trading within the firm. 
More specifically, our information market would allow firms 
to use their material, nonpublic information to earn profits in re-
turn for early-release products. The market price of the disclosure 
product would reflect the extent to which insider trading based 
on the material, nonpublic information is tolerated by the enter-
prise. Firms that do a good job of policing illegal trading by insid-
ers would be able to charge more for their information in the mar-
ket. The opposite would be true for firms that do a poor job on the 
insider trading beat. Consequently, firms would have greater in-
centives to ensure that their agents are not degrading the value 
of their information by trading in advance of company disclosure, 
as there would be a market price associated with firms permitting 
insider trading by executives. This type of system that encourages 
private enforcement would, on the margin, reduce insider trading 
as well as the negative externalities to which it is thought to give 
rise. 
The effect of this alteration may be especially important 
given the large number of public companies, larger number of 
public-company executives, and existing realities of government 
enforcement. Firms—or at least their large shareholders and the 
directors who look out for them—are well situated to spot viola-
tions of insider trading law. It is these actors that carefully follow 
all material developments at the company and how the market 
reacts to them. With this view from the front lines, they very well 
may be better situated to detect illegal activity than the DOJ and 
the SEC. Of course, the government may have some economy of 
 
 166 See Part II.C. 
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scale on this front. But there is no reason why firms could not hire 
businesses that specialize in detecting this activity to do the work 
for them. Companies already hire law firms to run internal inves-
tigations of various alleged illegality. Moreover, it is well-known 
that the government does just this with respect to outsourced 
technology aimed at insider trading detection.167 
In fact, mobilizing corporations to police their own executives’ 
use of corporate information in this way is arguably a more effi-
cient mechanism than relying on outsiders—be they the govern-
ment or private attorneys general. Even if no such relative claim 
can be made, it could provide efficient enforcement in and of itself. 
In other words, the change is desirable even if there were other 
changes to government enforcement that were more desirable. 
Two final points—each relating to the intersection of insider 
trading enforcement and corporate disclosure—are noteworthy 
here. 
First, to the extent the proposed market would lead to faster 
and more frequent disclosure of internal company information,168 
it would reduce insider trading in a second way: by making it 
harder for executives to earn trading profits on internal company 
information before market prices reflected the information. Insid-
ers who trade illegally on private information have strong reasons 
to complete their trading through a series of smaller trades over 
a substantial period of time rather than in a handful of large 
trades quickly after learning of new information. In short, run-
ning out of a positive board meeting and buying $500,000 of com-
pany shares raises red flags. But with the firm’s material, non-
public information exposed sooner, insiders would find 
themselves with less time to earn illegal trading profits. They 
would thus once again find themselves deterred on the margin 
from buying and selling shares illegally—or at least deterred from 
trading illegally in large quantities. 
Second, better-enforced law in this area could be a bulwark 
against the underproduction of corporate information. In many 
ways, this is merely the flip side of the first point. Executives gen-
erally decide the extent to which firms will provide information to 
 
 167 See Emily Flitter and Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. SEC’s Newest Enforcement Weapon: 
Powerful Software (Reuters, Feb 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/E4WP-E48S (dis-
cussing the SEC’s partnership with Palantir Technologies as an effort to “beef[ ] up its 
capacity to detect insider trading and other illegal activity”). 
 168 See Part III.B.1.a (noting the market’s potential to trigger improved disclosure 
along three dimensions, including frequency). 
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the public. Without the ability to earn private gains from the 
firm’s material, nonpublic information, they would be more likely 
to share that information with the public—and do so more 
quickly.169 But the ability to avoid sanction provides more than 
just perverse trading incentives for these executives; it also cre-
ates perverse disclosure incentives for them. Why should they dis-
close more company information (and do so sooner rather than 
later) if it eliminates their ability to profit on it in a quiet manner 
over a sustained period of time? Corporate executives are able to 
answer this question for themselves. That this generally bright 
and aggressive group has done so is supported by evidence cited 
earlier suggesting just how common trading on company infor-
mation before it is made available to all is today.170 Accordingly, 
our proposal would have an additional disclosure benefit not fo-
cused on earlier, as the corporate executives who decide the 
amount and pace of information sharing with the outside world 
would be less likely to hold onto the information for personal gain 
should the firm be in the business of selling early access to it ra-
ther than erring on the side of, at a minimum, delayed disclosure. 
* * * 
This Part has demonstrated just what could happen to the 
main areas of securities law—and thus securities law as a 
whole—if regulators permitted market forces that are now sup-
pressed to operate. With Reg FD and related regulatory stances 
liberalized to allow firms to sell early-access products, an infor-
mation market would arise. With information consumer demand 
unleashed in a competitive market for information, firms would 
have a revenue-based motivation to give investors and other ac-
tual users of corporate information what they want, give it to 
them in a form that is most valuable to them, and do it more often 
than under current law. All the while, the characteristics of the 
market itself would also shed much light on the extent to which 
the law requires the supply of disclosure items despite a lack of 
market interest in them. Federal judges could also look to this 
same market to replace the overinclusive fraud-on-the-market 
presumption with a participated-in-the-information-market one 
that could improve the quality of the most significant type of pri-
vate securities litigation today. Lastly, among other things, the 
 
 169 See note 28 and accompanying text. 
 170 See notes 112–15 and accompanying text. 
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revenues firms would garner in the market could provide power-
ful incentives to better police illegal trading and tipping activity 
within the firm, as that activity would deflate the value for which 
the firm would be able to sell its information in the information 
market. 
IV.  OBJECTIONS AND FURTHER FRAMEWORK FOR DEBATE 
Even if one agrees with us that a market for corporate infor-
mation can lead to the benefits we describe above, the question of 
the overall desirability of pursuing this approach still remains. To 
address that question, in this final Part we consider a variety of 
objections to the market that thoughtful critics might raise. We 
consider general objections and then ones that are more specific 
to each of our three areas of focus (disclosure, fraud, and insider 
trading law). In so doing, we aim to complete the larger goal of 
this Article: to set forth a new market-based approach to improve 
securities law as a whole and provide a framework for considering 
whether society would be better off by pursuing it. 
A. General Objections 
As a general matter, thoughtful critics might object to our ap-
proach on the grounds that, despite our earlier representations, 
it actually does require changes to insider trading law and that, 
in reality, it is unfair to ordinary investors. We take each of these 
general critiques in turn in this Section. 
1. It requires changes to insider trading law. 
At the threshold, it is important to note that this critique is 
not one that goes to the merits of our approach. Instead, it is spe-
cific only to the amount of legal reform necessary to pursue it. 
That said, at least a small part of the appeal of our approach is 
that it requires so little by way of regulatory change.171 And the 
approach targets the same information around which insider 
trading law revolves. For these reasons, we address here the ex-
tent to which insider trading law presents an additional bar on 
the operation of our market. 
There are two relevant prohibitions on insider trading: the 
classical theory and the misappropriation theory.172 A company’s 
 
 171 See Part III.A. 
 172 See Part I.C. 
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open provision of its own information cannot be said to violate the 
misappropriation theory. Such a transparent practice, by defini-
tion, would not involve any sort of deceptive procurement and use 
of information.173 And a misappropriation violation of § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 requires such deception.174 Indeed, there would be no 
misappropriation of information at all because the information 
would be used in ways allowed by its source, something that in 
and of itself takes this contemplated market activity outside the 
scope of the misappropriation theory. 
Thinking about the consistency of our proposal with the clas-
sical theory is more complicated, but the conclusion is equally 
clear. The classical theory requires a violation of the Chiarella v 
United States175 duty to disclose information to counterparties in 
the market or to abstain from trading on the information (or tip-
ping others with an eye toward them doing the same).176 The duty 
is imposed on corporate executives.177 But its application to firms 
themselves is far from clear. Many courts have ruled that firms—
 
 173 See Part I.C. 
 174 See United States v O’Hagan, 521 US 642, 653–54 (1997) (“We agree with the 
Government that misappropriation . . . satisfies § 10(b)’s requirement that chargeable con-
duct involve a ‘deceptive device or contrivance’ used ‘in connection with’ the purchase or 
sale of securities. We observe, first, that misappropriators, as the Government describes 
them, deal in deception.”); Santa Fe Industries, Inc v Green, 430 US 462, 473–74 (1977) 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted): 
The language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any 
conduct not involving manipulation or deception. Nor have we been cited to any 
evidence in the legislative history that would support a departure from the lan-
guage of the statute. “When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipu-
lation and deception, . . . and when its history reflects no more expansive intent, 
we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute. . . .” Thus the claim of 
fraud and fiduciary breach in this complaint states a cause of action under any 
part of Rule 10b-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as “manipula-
tive or deceptive” within the meaning of the statute. 
 175 445 US 222 (1980). 
 176 See id at 235 (“When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can 
be no fraud absent a duty to speak.”). 
 177 See id at 227 (“That the relationship between a corporate insider and the stockhold-
ers of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obligation is not a novel twist of the law.”). 
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like their executives—cannot trade on the basis of material, non-
public information.178 Some have even done so with great confi-
dence in themselves.179 But others have come to very different con-
clusions—finding no fit between trading by firms and the classical 
theory.180 These courts are supported by the fact that insider trad-
ing law is developed from the fiduciary duty law that applies only 
to directors and officers. Further support is provided by the fact 
that there are considerable disclosure requirements imposed on 
firms when selling securities to the public—requirements which 
are largely absent when the firm is buying back securities from 
the same.181 
Whatever the precise duty of the corporation with respect to 
trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information in the sec-
ondary market (namely, through share buybacks), it is hard to 
imagine a court finding that the transparent, well-advertised sale 
of information by a firm involves the requisite deception.182 That 
is especially true when the firm is selling securities in compliance 
with the many disclosure rules applicable to new issues of securi-
ties. Moreover, the firm here would not itself be trading but would 
instead provide the information to others who would be trading. 
Such “tipping” is actionable only when the tipper provided the tip 
in return for a personal benefit, as opposed to with an eye toward 
helping the firm.183 In our market, the information would of course 
be marketed by the firm for the firm even if insiders were the ones 
directing that conduct. 
2. It will be unfair to ordinary investors. 
Some may object to our approach on ordinary-investor fair-
ness grounds. To them, unequal access to market-moving 
 
 178 See, for example, McCormick v Fund American Companies, Inc, 26 F3d 869, 876 
(9th Cir 1994) (“Numerous authorities have held or otherwise stated that the corporate 
issuer in possession of material nonpublic information, must, like other insiders in the 
same situation, disclose that information to its shareholders or refrain from trading with 
them.”). 
 179 See, for example, Green v Hamilton International Corp, 437 F Supp 723, 728 
(SDNY 1977) (“[T]here can be no doubt that the prohibition against ‘insider’ trading ex-
tends to a corporation.”). 
 180 See Mark J. Loewenstein and William K.S. Wang, The Corporation as Insider 
Trader, 30 Del J Corp L 45, 59–70 (2005) (discussing arguments against treating corporate 
issuers as insiders). 
 181 See id. 
 182 See text accompanying notes 54–56. 
 183 See Dirks v Securities and Exchange Commission, 463 US 646, 663 (1983). 
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information is just unfair. To be sure, the market will undoubt-
edly result in informational unevenness: sophisticated profession-
als will have access to valuable information at times when ordi-
nary Joes will not. It follows that the proposal will likely touch at 
least a policymaker’s nerve relating to concerns for basic 
ordinary-investor fairness—whether that concern is based on un-
equal access itself, the possible results of that unequal access on 
investor well-being, or related concerns for confidence in the 
market.184 
Fairness is important, not least because it goes to issues of 
wealth distribution and investor confidence in the market. But we 
do not think it cuts against our approach. This is because our 
market will improve well-being for ordinary investors, thereby 
making our approach arguably fairer. 
In our 2016 article, we showed why the best that can be said 
about the Commission’s informational fairness agenda—mani-
fested most obviously in the simultaneous disclosure obligation 
found in Reg FD—is that it has an ambiguous impact on the well-
being of average investors.185 That held for both those ordinary 
investors who invest directly through retail-level brokerage ac-
counts as well as for those who do so only indirectly through index 
funds and the like. Moreover, we explained why it likely harms 
the most vulnerable set of ordinary investors (the direct-trading 
individuals) in the market.186 Further, we explained why simple 
changes in the law, such as requiring set information-release win-
dows each day or the disclosure of upcoming disclosure, would 
better accomplish the regulation’s primary stated end.187 
Pointing to this description, without repeating the points we 
made in our earlier paper, should suffice here. But it is still worth-
while emphasizing some of the larger points we made in our 
earlier paper to further reveal the impact of our current proposal 
on ordinary investors. Our proposal is for a clearly delineated, 
 
 184 See Part III.A. 
 185 See Haeberle and Henderson, 101 Cornell L Rev at 1419–30 (cited in note 13). 
More specifically, we showed that Reg FD simply swapped a market in which there was 
slightly heightened information asymmetry over prolonged pre-public-release periods and 
acutely lower information asymmetry after public releases for one in which there is 
slightly lessened information asymmetry over prolonged pre-public-release periods and 
markedly higher information asymmetry in post-public-release ones. How that swap 
changed the well-being for ordinary investors is something that is far from clear—and 
something the SEC has never examined, let alone identified. 
 186 See id. 
 187 See id at 1430–37. 
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transparent, early-access market.188 Today, the law—including 
Reg FD—does not require any notice whatsoever of the upcoming 
release of market-moving information. Instead, it merely bars in-
siders from trading on that information before it is released and 
then requires firms to make that information available to all in-
vestors at the same exact time.189 For this reason, many ordinary 
individuals will in fact find themselves buying or selling in the 
moments just after any one of the thirty-five hundred or so public 
companies first releases new information. When information is 
released to all investors at the same time during the trading day, 
ordinary investors therefore find themselves paying the costs as-
sociated with a market in which some will inevitably be better 
informed than them. In short, despite the rubric of fairness and 
ordinary-investor concern that governs the release of information 
today,190 considerable numbers of ordinary investors are ravaged 
at the watering hole in the moments just after information is re-
leased in compliance with the law.191 
This is because the professional investors are significantly 
more powerful than average investors. Professional traders colo-
cate their facilities at stock exchanges enabling them to trade in 
microseconds, meaning even simultaneously disclosed infor-
mation cannot possibly be simultaneously acted on, which is what 
really matters.192 If one has information but cannot possibly act 
on it before it is stale (that is, already baked into prices), then the 
“fairness” of getting it at the same time as others is empty. Pro-
fessional traders also write sophisticated algorithms that make 
virtually instantaneous trading decisions once they receive new 
information. As noted in our work from 2016, a study from the 
same year demonstrated that market-moving information can be 
incorporated into market prices in less than the time it takes an 
eye to blink.193 An average investor hearing news about Facebook 
on CNBC has no chance of beating the professionals to this punch. 
And mandating that information be made available to everyone 
at the same time does not create any postrelease, ordinary-
investor fairness with respect to the race to incorporate new in-
formation into stock prices, as the professionals are simply too 
 
 188 See notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 189 See Part III.A. 
 190 See notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
 191 See Haeberle and Henderson, 101 Cornell L Rev at 1427–30 (cited in note 13). 
 192 See note 139 (discussing colocation practices). 
 193 See Haeberle and Henderson, 101 Cornell L Rev at 1398 (cited in note 13), citing 
Hu, Pan, and Wang, 126 J Fin Econ 399, 419 (cited in note 14). 
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fast for there to be any legitimate competition from at least indi-
vidual amateurs. 
Admittedly, during the early-release periods we propose, in-
formation asymmetries between market participants will be 
higher than those associated with normal trading environments. 
However, whatever ordinary-investor harm results from the en-
hanced information asymmetry that occurs during the proposed 
early-release periods must be viewed alongside the effect Reg FD 
has on them in postrelease ones. And it is in those periods, as ex-
plained above, that ordinary investors suffer. 
Still, we need not speculate whether our approach would help 
or hurt ordinary investors on the whole. Adding a simple regula-
tory overlay on our proposal—providing all investors with notice 
of upcoming tiered releases of information—would result in ordi-
nary investors (other than ones engaged in noise trading194) suf-
fering less harm from information releases than they do today. 
With this notice, these investors could move their trading away 
from the dangerous windows in which new information is re-
leased to the market. 
The requirement we suggest would ensure clear announce-
ments to the public that warn of upcoming tiered releases of in-
formation and the costly asymmetries they are likely to generate. 
(Along with this notice that companies would have to make, we 
would also require some maximum window in which the infor-
mation would have to be revealed to all investors.195) The an-
nouncement would have to state that an early release of infor-
mation is planned for certain explicitly named dates and times. It 
would also have to provide that market participants who do not 
have access to the information or the means necessary to analyze 
its import on par with sophisticated professionals might want to 
steer clear of financial instrument markets around those times. 
This type of warning would thus provide notice for at least indi-
vidual investors and index fund managers who did not purchase 
the information to steer clear of trouble.196 
 
 194 See note 214 and accompanying text (explaining how the information market 
would likely affect noise traders). Noise traders base their trades on a perceived informa-
tional advantage. However, the information on which they rely is actually already re-
flected in the price of the stock. Haeberle and Henderson, 101 Cornell L Rev at 1403–04 
(cited in note 13); Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, and Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Stock 
Market Manipulation and Its Regulation, 35 Yale J Reg 67, 88 (2018). 
 195 See note 11 and accompanying text. 
 196 The contemplated announcement should be made available to all potential inves-
tors. But that should not be hard. Firms could make the announcement via the method 
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Duly warned, rational, ordinary investors would temporarily 
exit the market. These investors should place no value on early 
access to disclosures and, as a consequence, will not rationally pay 
for it or participate in the market when others who have are trad-
ing opposite each other and noise traders.197 The same should ap-
ply to index fund managers.198 Soon after (often in a matter of se-
conds), they could safely reenter the market with much, if not all, 
of the earlier-released information already incorporated into 
prices. 
If the costs associated with monitoring releases from a few 
thousand public companies are too high on any of the affected 
parties, set early-release windows could be considered or man-
dated. For example, early-release periods could be limited to 
12:00 pm to 1:00 pm on each trading day. We think these windows 
would be especially attractive, as they would limit any heightened 
information asymmetry associated with the disclosure of upcom-
ing disclosure. If these windows existed each day for all firms 
from 12:00 pm to 1:00 pm, the chances of any individual firm re-
leasing new information in that period would be slim. For that 
reason, little to no prerelease trading in anticipation of a tiered 
release should occur. 
Still, these set windows introduce other costs, namely those 
associated with ordinary-investor pullback from the market to 
protect against possible information release and its associated 
costs. Liquidity will be reduced in these periods, and this is not 
free. But whatever such illiquidity appeared as a result of a 
shorter normal trading day that is split in two could be dealt with 
by extending the standard trading day beyond the current 
9:30 am to 4:00 pm Eastern time one. We could just add an 
additional hour of trading in this scenario. All of these changes 
 
they use when making their disclosures today. Consistent with that law, they would use 
media “reasonably designed to effect broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the infor-
mation to the public.” 65 Fed Reg at 51716 (cited in note 126). Specifically, the dissemina-
tion of the warning could be administered through the existing regulatory framework in 
the area. The market-related activities of firms, trading platforms, and stockbrokers are 
already regulated under a developed framework set up by the SEC. Exchange Act § 11A, 
codified at 15 USC § 78(k)(1) (delegating to the SEC the authority to regulate the trading 
of public-company stocks). This legal framework requires trading platforms to be accessi-
ble only to registered brokers—meaning that all investors must generally go through bro-
kers to access them. For this reason, the law could ensure fair notice of early-release peri-
ods by requiring brokers to have systems in place to warn their clients when they are 
about to trade in such a period. 
 197 See note 14 and accompanying text. 
 198 See note 14 and accompanying text. 
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introduce other costs and benefits, and detailed consideration of 
them is far beyond the scope of this work. But it is worth noting 
that the operational costs of bifurcating the trading day around a 
set early-release period and extending trading at exchanges and 
alternative trading systems (so-called “dark” pools and the like) 
would be relatively small. Each of those platforms is almost com-
pletely electronic.199 
Whether there is disclosure of disclosure or some daily set 
information-release window, ordinary investors would have the 
notice necessary to delay their trading in a low-cost way. Thanks 
to the notice associated with either as well as the proposed out-
side limit on early-release times, the periods in which ordinary 
investors would want to stay clear of the market would be rela-
tively small—especially when viewed from the perspective of a 
portfolio trader. Ex ante, whether their orders that help them as-
semble, balance, and liquidate pieces of their portfolios are exe-
cuted in a fraction of a millisecond, a second, a minute, an hour, 
a week, or even longer is largely irrelevant to them.200 
Certainly, some ordinary investors engaged in portfolio trad-
ing would nevertheless transact during the periods of high infor-
mation asymmetry. Although we doubt it is the case for most of 
these investors, the transaction costs of exiting the market during 
early-release periods might be higher than the expected losses as-
sociated with trading in them. Or some ordinary investors may 
simply not see obvious warning signs no matter how clearly the 
law posts them. Other ordinary investors will fail to detect and 
avoid harder-to-spot early-release periods. These failures are the 
natural consequence of a market in which up to approximately 
 
 199 For an overview of this “new” electronic stock market, see Merritt B. Fox, 
Lawrence R. Glosten, and Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: Sense and 
Nonsense, 65 Duke L J 191, 199 (2015). See also Kevin S. Haeberle, Discrimination 
Platforms, 42 J Corp L 809, 812–18 (2017) (providing a nuanced overview of the trade 
transparency and trader-access practices at exchanges and alternative trading systems 
today). 
 200 Portfolio trading, unlike information trading, involves little time sensitivity. See gen-
erally Larry Harris, Trading & Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners 488–91 
(2003) (discussing index investing and its “buy and hold” approach). By definition, indexing 
investors and the like are not transacting based on information about firms’ prospects rela-
tive to current market prices that is fast depreciating in value. See id. Rather, they are 
simply trying to assemble and maintain a portfolio that tracks some large part of the market 
or to liquidate it in light of consumption needs. See id; note 14. Before their transactions take 
place, as far as they know, stock prices during that next interval of time have a more or less 
50-50 chance of increasing or decreasing. The idea is simply that stock prices follow a random 
walk after all new public information has been incorporated into them. See generally Eugene 
F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J Bus 34 (1965). 
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thirty-five hundred public firms would be selling early-access 
rights and in which the material information released by one firm 
would often be relevant, not just for it but for a wide range of 
firms. In these cases, even rational ordinary investors might suf-
fer harm should the law allow an early-access market.201 
Some ordinary investors might not be rational. For example, 
many noise traders will knowingly opt to trade in the periods just 
after new information is first released. But concern for these in-
vestors who have voluntarily subjected themselves to the cost of 
information asymmetry is only nominally disconcerting from any 
reasonable view of fairness. In fact, their proclivity to subject 
themselves to losses associated with a market in which partici-
pants are unevenly informed is likely a selling point for our pro-
posal for many. The information market will make noise trading 
more obvious, make the dangers of it more acutely known by trad-
ers, and should, by raising the costs of it, reduce it. This final 
point should be clear by the time we complete our discussion of 
the concern for extrafirm information production later in this 
Part.202 
Three final points bear mention. First, in addition to the new 
protection our approach lends to ordinary investors, it also allows 
them to participate in early-access markets if they so choose. Av-
erage investors can pool together in investment funds of various 
kinds, such as pension funds or actively managed mutual funds, 
and these large institutional investors can serve as a means of 
accessing the information market in a cost-effective and even 
profitable manner. This possibility is a crucial linchpin of new se-
curities markets, such as those for venture capital and private 
equity, and the logic applies here as well. For the especially savvy 
ordinary investor, perhaps even direct access to information 
would be profitable. 
Second, by making periods of heightened informational 
asymmetries (that is, periods around corporate disclosures) more 
transparent, the result for all ordinary investors should be lower 
fees for index funds. Passive funds try to avoid periods of height-
ened informational asymmetries because they can suffer when 
better-informed traders are more present in the market. Accord-
ingly, passive funds now invest clients’ and shareholders’ money 
 
 201 The law could address the latter concern by requiring all firms to limit their early-
release periods to a single standard window—for example, each Wednesday between 
10:30 am and 2:30 pm. 
 202 See Part IV.B.3. 
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in an attempt to predict these periods and withdraw from the 
market when they are present. But by making such periods obvi-
ous, these monies can be saved and returned to ordinary investors. 
Third, it is possible that putting a price on corporate infor-
mation for firms would actually result in firms shifting infor-
mation releases from after-market-hours periods to intramarket 
ones. If that is the case, then the disclosure, fraud, and insider 
trading benefits we anticipated might be quite powerful. To the 
extent those benefits came along with such a shift in disclosure 
timing, the intraday trading environment would be subject to 
more information asymmetry. With our required disclosure of dis-
closure or set information-release periods, we don’t see this as a 
problem for ordinary investors. But such a dynamic could have 
broader implications for securities trading and all that it impacts.  
Overall, there are many possible twists and turns along the 
path we envision for improved securities law. As these twists 
emerge, informed regulations would likely be desirable. But for 
present purposes, it is clear that making the information asym-
metries that are part and parcel of financial instrument markets 
explicit and demarcating a time-constrained period of postrelease 
asymmetry would provide ordinary investors with a greater abil-
ity to detect and avoid dangerous postrelease periods than they 
have today. For that reason, any ordinary-investor “fairness” con-
cern203 like that behind Reg FD should be assuaged, as whatever 
results simultaneity now achieves for ordinary investors (and 
then some) can be obtained under the well-regulated system that 
allows an early-access market like the one we offer.204 
B. Objections Specific to Securities Disclosure Law 
The disclosure benefits we anticipate the information market 
to generate showcased earlier205 must be considered in light of a 
number of reasonable objections that could be made. This Section 
identifies those objections and considers their merit. Specifically, 
 
 203 To the extent the concern is for perceptions of fairness alone, we think the law 
should encourage education and acknowledgment of reality rather than indulging fiction. 
 204 Notice provisions along the lines discussed in this Section would also help ordinary 
investors today, when simultaneous information revelation is required. But we do not sup-
port their imposition should the law continue to require simultaneity, as that notice would 
likely erode information production and sharing. See Haeberle and Henderson, 101 
Cornell L Rev at 1432–33 (cited in note 13). We discuss our proposal’s distinct impact on 
this information function below in Part IV.B. 
 205 See Part III.B.1. 
2018] A New Market-Based Approach to Securities Law 1369 
 
it considers whether (1) those benefits would be muted by insuffi-
cient corporate supply of early-access products; (2) the same 
would result from a lack of market activity on the demand side; 
(3) the market approach would actually present a net harm to in-
formation production by reducing the quality of securities analy-
sis by those outside the firm; (4) the market approach would ac-
tually lead to delayed disclosure; and (5) the disclosure 
overproduction signal is incomplete in a problematic way. 
1. There won’t be enough supply. 
One might object to our information-market approach for se-
curities law on the grounds that the full extent of the market-
based improvements that we foresee would not come to fruition 
because, even if permitted to sell early access to their disclosures, 
firms wouldn’t do so and would instead generally continue to dis-
seminate them simultaneously on their own accord. If that is the 
case, little—if any—improvement would result for the quality of 
corporate disclosure. 
There are several reasons to think that firms might not sup-
ply early-access rights to information consumers. 
First, the marginal benefit of producing enhanced disclosure 
products may simply be small—and thus not exceed the marginal 
costs of the same. If that were the case, then firms would choose 
not to supply any type of early-access product—let alone en-
hanced ones. 
A second reason why firms might not supply these products 
is traceable to a distinct issue. Despite our conclusions about how 
the market would leave ordinary investors financially better off 
than they are today,206 it is entirely possible that those investors 
would not fully internalize that conclusion. Consequently, they 
might mistakenly think that the sale of early-access rights harms 
them and therefore oppose early-access initiatives by the firms 
they own. 
Still, everyday investors may have little ability to change 
something they vehemently oppose, as they generally play little 
to no direct role in shaping management decisions. However, 
many do have significant indirect influence over management be-
cause they invest through large mutual funds. Those funds have 
considerable formal voting power as well as much informal sway 
 
 206 See text accompanying notes 185–96. 
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over corporate boards.207 Knowing of any concern among their 
clients about the sale of early-access products, those funds might 
use their power in the boardroom to stop firms from participating 
in the market—and trumpet their guardianship after doing so. 
Return-maximizing funds run by the Fidelities and TIAA-
CREFs of the world might very well not fight any such push by 
ordinary investors even when companies have concluded that 
selling early-access products would increase profitability. For one 
thing, fund executives may think the fairness perceptions are 
more important for their bottom line than realities. These funds 
may prefer to indulge in myth rather than to acknowledge the 
realities of securities markets. For another, these funds do not 
only engage in index-based investing. They also sell actively man-
aged investments. Should firms continue with the status quo, 
those managed funds would continue to share first access to dis-
closures without paying for it. But if companies sell early-release 
products, then these funds would have to pay up in order to stay 
in the game. So these influential players might resist changes 
that effectively shift the burden of funding corporate disclosure 
from firms to them. Given this latter point, the funds may not just 
respond to concerned clients but instead may actually instigate 
the push against the supply of early-access products in the first 
place. 
Lastly, for the same “pay for what you now get for free” rea-
son, other investment funds that hold large blocks of public-
company shares (for example, activist hedge funds) may likewise 
stop companies from selling early-access products. To the extent 
that they hold board seats, or even less formal sway over manage-
ment, the end result might very well be abstention on the part of 
firms when it comes to participation in the early-access market. 
We cannot do more than speculate as to the numbers that 
would be plugged into either side of the cost-benefit calculation 
executives would undertake when considering enhanced, early-
access disclosures. But we can say that the market itself would 
generate at least the marginal benefit numbers and produce in-
formation on the extent to which they exceed the marginal cost of 
 
 207 A handful of mutual fund businesses are the record holders of large portions of 
America’s publicly traded companies and therefore vote a large number of shares in cor-
porate referendums. See Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk, and Javier Garcia-Bernardo, 
Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-concentration of Corporate 
Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 Bus & Polit 298, 311–15 (2017) (documenting the 
breadth of the holdings of the three largest mutual funds in American public companies). 
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the same. We can also say that there is little harm in permitting 
firms to sell their disclosures if all that results is the status quo. 
If the market-clearing price for early-access products is zero, 
firms will simply continue to provide their existing disclosures. 
No harm, no foul. 
Our view is that these concerns about the extent to which 
management will partake in the market for disclosures (including 
the ones associated with ordinary-investor misunderstandings 
and angry ownership) should not be overly problematic. We do not 
mean to belittle these considerations. But it is important to rec-
ognize that they would have to be weighed against the benefits 
the company would realize thanks to this new line of business and 
its expected revenues. To be sure, management may not use an 
enterprise-level cost-benefit calculation in coming to its decision 
on whether or not to sell. Instead, it may factor in the personal 
costs associated with defying powerful funds (for example, “I’m 
going to make my life more difficult by ticking off board mem-
bers”). No matter the benefit to the company’s bottom line, sup-
plying early-access products may be unappealing to management 
if engaging in that line of business costs them personally. But cor-
porate law can seek to address that agency problem if it comes to 
fruition. For example, it could subject decisions not to sell to more 
penetrating judicial scrutiny than that associated with the busi-
ness judgment rule, perhaps requiring management to justify 
those decisions with company-level cost-benefit analysis. 
Still, there is a crucial part of the supply equation that must 
be kept in mind. The main company benefit of supplying early-
access products under our proposal may not be revenue. Rather, 
it might be saved costs, as a key part of our market-based ap-
proach is relief from overbroad class actions.208 These litigation 
savings alone might compel robust supply of early-access prod-
ucts even if the price tag on those products is small. 
Lastly, it is important to remember that there already are 
prominent examples of robust information-producer supply of 
early-access products. Each year, a long list of entities other than 
public firms generates new information that moves markets and 
makes it broadly available to the public. Some of these entities 
that produce this valuable information—such as securities 
analysis firms—specifically gear their information production 
toward investors who are looking to buy underpriced securities 
 
 208 See Part III.B.2. 
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and sell overpriced ones. Others—such as the government, uni-
versities, and trade associations—have primarily directed their 
generation of information toward furthering their own non-
securities-based ends.209 There has traditionally been no bar on 
the selective release of either of these types of information. As 
such, before the most prominent state-level regulator of Wall 
Street put a halt to it, there was an emerging practice in which 
the latter set of information was routinely being released early to 
high-speed traders in a market for information.210 
Ultimately, we cannot say whether our information market 
would have a similar amount of supply to that found in these 
ones. It might have far more or far less. And we cannot say 
whether that supply would generate more than simply seconds-
early products aimed at high-speed traders—although the market 
for days-early analysis by outside securities analysts suggests 
that it would. Corporate production of early-access rights may be 
far larger (especially if it allows firms to avail themselves of class 
action relief) or far smaller than that associated with either of 
these markets. But the products in both cases are similar enough 
to make them nevertheless instructive. 
2. There won’t be enough demand. 
One might also object to the proposal on a related basis: even 
if the law allowed market forces to operate with minimal legal 
friction in this area, there may be little demand for early-access 
products. With insufficient demand, it is hard to imagine robust 
improvements to corporate disclosure. 
For market forces to unleash the full benefits that we antici-
pate, information traders would have to value early access to in-
formation enough to be willing to pay an amount large enough to 
 
 209 See, for example, Haeberle and Henderson, 101 Cornell L Rev at 1389–92 & n 35 
(cited in note 13) (discussing the University of Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment, 
the Chicago Business Barometer, and the Institute for Supply Management’s manufactur-
ing index). 
 210 See id at 1387–92; Brody Mullins, et al, Traders Pay for an Early Peek at Key Data, 
Wall St J A1 (June 13, 2013) (“[S]elling early access [to non-governmental, market-moving 
information] is routine.”); Michael Rothfeld and Brody Mullins, Peeks Are Still Available 
for Some Key Economic Data (Wall St J, July 8, 2013), online at http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/peeks-are-still-available-for-some-key-economic-data-1390488428 (visited Apr 9, 
2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (“Many high-speed traders and hedge funds pay non-
governmental organizations for early access to economic reports and other data that often 
affect financial markets.”). 
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incentivize firms to enhance disclosure. Traders will pay a signif-
icant amount for early-access rights only if they are able to use 
them to earn substantial trading profits. 
For an information trader to earn profits in the zero-sum 
game of stock trading, some other market participant has to suf-
fer trading losses. When it comes to trading based on corporate 
announcements, the losers are often portfolio traders or noise 
traders who happen to be swimming by during the feeding time 
that occurs just after new material information is released.211 In 
this way, “uninformed” traders compensate “informed” ones for 
the work they do in improving stock price accuracy at any time.212 
By encouraging ordinary investors of both types to leave the 
market (to improve their outcomes), our proposal limits the size 
of the meal. To ensure ordinary-investor fairness, we insist on 
clear notice of early-release periods.213 With those periods trans-
parent to the public in this way, at least savvy portfolio traders 
who heeded these mandatory warnings would take a simple step 
to protect themselves: take a time-out from their non-time-
sensitive trading.214 Thus, during the early-release periods for 
which we advocate, the “easy money,” in Wall Street parlance, 
would flee the market, and information traders might find their 
early peeks to be of limited value. Consequently, the notice-based 
safeguards would leave those traders without what may be their 
primary source of profit, at least during early-release periods and 
those periods that immediately follow them, thereby curtailing 
their demand for early access to disclosures.215 The disclosure-
quality benefit provided by the market-based regime for which we 
advocate would then be, at best, largely muted. 
The concern here is a powerful one and, therefore, one that 
should lead to interesting debate as to whether the proposal is 
 
 211 See Haeberle and Henderson, 101 Cornell L Rev at 1419–24 (cited in note 13); 
Part IV.A.2. 
 212 For the original work modeling how uninformed portfolio traders and noise traders 
fund the profits earned by informed traders, see generally Albert S. Kyle, Continuous 
Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 Econometrica 1315 (1985). 
 213 See Part IV.A.2. 
 214 See Part IV.A.2. 
 215 Interestingly, any disclosure of upcoming disclosure might in and of itself lead to 
information-based trading based on the fact that a new disclosure is coming and specula-
tion as to its content. The precise trading dynamics that would ensue are interesting to 
think about but well beyond the scope of this work. But it is worth noting that any concern 
about such trading could be addressed through deploying set information-release windows 
each day rather than requiring specific disclosures of upcoming disclosure. 
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worth pursuing. However, that debate should acknowledge signif-
icant counterarguments. 
At the threshold, it is important to note that information 
traders may still have a high amount of profit-based demand for 
early-release products. For example, one might think that an-
nouncement traders would demand early access to information 
only if they could guarantee they were the only ones to receive 
this information. However, this misunderstands the nature of 
how these investors use information and vastly overstates the 
ability of a large group of investors to coordinate their behavior. 
To be sure, all professional investors (many thousands across the 
world) might want to coordinate and refrain from paying early-
access fees, as the same information would be released shortly 
thereafter. Every professional would be better off if all profession-
als would refrain from jumping the gun. But this presents an in-
surmountable collective action problem that the early-access mar-
ket exploits to the benefit of corporations and average investors. 
Any attempt to form a cartel among professional investors that 
would include them all and be effective at shunning the early-
access market is doomed to fail—and would be illegal under anti-
trust law to boot. 
Moreover, our proposal does not bar these and other infor-
mation traders from feasting on noise traders and portfolio traders. 
Instead, it merely places a “Swim at Your Own Risk” sign by the 
water.216 It is not uncommon to see surfers and triathletes putting 
on dark wetsuits and jumping into waters known to be frequented 
by great whites—and doing so at dawn and dusk no less. Analo-
gously, despite the warnings that we would require, many individ-
ual investors who trade directly through brokerage accounts will 
still trade in the moments after firms release disclosures selec-
tively.217 And even institutional portfolio traders would likely do 
the same to some degree, perhaps even rationally at times.218 Thus, 
it is likely that speculating professionals will still be able to earn 
profits based on first access to corporate announcements. 
But even if all portfolio-trading and noise-trading investors 
avoided the market in the moments after new disclosures were 
 
 216 See Part IV.A.2. 
 217 See Haeberle and Henderson, 101 Cornell L Rev at 1427–29 (cited in note 13) (de-
scribing certain ordinary investors who mistakenly think that “there is a level playing 
field among various trader types when it comes to the ability to procure, analyze, and 
trade on newly announced information”). 
 218 See id at 1401–03 (discussing the investing strategies of institutional portfolio 
traders). 
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first shared with information traders, the latter might still have 
a high amount of relevant demand. While these traders surely 
profit from those easy marks, they also profit from each other. 
One such instance of this type of direct information-trader-
versus-information-trader buying and selling is the type that 
often takes place immediately after well-advertised releases of in-
formation today. In these very brief postrelease moments, savvy 
portfolio traders are thought to back away from the market, leav-
ing information traders to trade among themselves. 
The trading among sophisticated professionals that takes 
place during these periods is intuitive enough. These traders of-
ten have divergent views of what any given piece of new infor-
mation means for stocks’ values. Consequently, they are more 
than happy to purchase from, and sell to, each other as they battle 
it out to determine the more accurate price of a given stock. When 
the dust settles, some information traders profit and others lose. 
In fact, it is along these exact lines that the trading that took 
place immediately after the well-documented early release of 
Michigan’s consumer sentiment index proceeded.219 In that case, 
high-speed traders were to some degree paying for early-access 
rights with the aim of earning trading profits against other trad-
ers with the same information—even if those profits were likely 
reduced due to the absence of at least savvy portfolio traders dur-
ing the early-release periods.220 Thus, professional investors (not 
always known for their humility) will likely believe that they can 
beat other professional investors with the same information, ei-
ther through speed of execution or better analysis. 
There is an additional reason why a professional investor 
might pay for early access. Even if a professional would not pay 
for early access to information about a semiconductor manufac-
turer to help it trade in that manufacturer’s stock if it knew that 
other professional investors would have the same information at 
the same time, that investor might pay for the information to use 
it to trade some other security. After all, information from 
Manufacturer A tells us not only about the value of the stock of 
Manufacturer A, but also about its competitors Manufacturers B, 
 
 219 See id at 1413 (noting that certain firms may remove themselves from the market 
prior to a news release in order to “protect themselves from incurring losses to better-
informed traders around the time at which they occur”). 
 220 About twelve firms subscribed to a 9:54:58 am computer-readable premium feed, 
each paying about $6,000 per month. See Peter Lattman, Thomson Reuters to Suspend Early 
Peeks at Key Index (NY Times, July 7, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/8NHS-DTF7. 
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C, D, and so on. In addition, the information might tell the inves-
tor something about computer sales, smartphone sales, or a host 
of other industries. Even more, the information might feed into 
an algorithm that predicts a broad stock market index, the price 
of the dollar in currency markets, or the future price of gold. 
The point is simply that information can be valuable even 
when other people have it (if you have different predictions or can 
get to market first) or if it can be used to predict outcomes in re-
lated areas. In short, there are multiple uses of any piece of cor-
porate information, and this means the scope of potential early-
access demand is likely too large and diverse to make abstention 
from the market the optimal individual choice for professional in-
vestors. And as some of these investors choose to participate, the 
incentive for others to follow grows, lest they be left out of the 
information-trading game altogether. 
Further, this analysis of likely demand is overly narrow. 
Even if information traders do not have sufficient demand, others 
mentioned earlier might.221 For example, news services may pay 
for a minutes- or hours-early head start over the competition. 
This may be true even if they were barred from redisseminating 
the new information until it was made public. The head start may 
allow them more time to carefully consider it before reporting on 
it—something that might be welcome in a world of twenty-four-
hour cable and online breaking news. Or perhaps the extra time—
measured in even smaller increments—would be valuable to 
them for mere content-formatting and presentation reasons. Cur-
rent practices with respect to the early release of Department of 
Labor data to news professionals confirm our intuitions.222 
Lastly, just as with the concern for insufficient supply that 
we discuss above,223 it is important to remember that there is little 
harm in allowing the market to tell us that there is insufficient 
demand for early-access products. And like with the incentive for 
firms to supply early-access products in order to avail themselves 
of our limitation on current FOTM actions, traders may have 
more demand for early-access products if they include a right to 
 
 221 See text accompanying note 11. 
 222 See US Department of Labor Press Lock-ups Policy Statement and News 
Organization Agreement *1 (Department of Labor, Oct 1, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/KQR8-D779. See also Bernard Baumohl, The Secrets of Economic 
Indicators: Hidden Clues to Future Economic Trends and Investment Opportunities 
1–4 (Wharton 1st ed 2004). 
 223 See Part IV.B.1. 
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participate in private litigation should there be a false or mislead-
ing statement in them. 
3. It will reduce outside information production and 
sharing. 
Healthy debate may also revolve around whether the pro-
posed information market would dampen information production 
and sharing on the whole and, thus, stock price accuracy. 
Although one of the chief appeals of the market we tout is its 
potential to boost information production and sharing by provid-
ing firms with the incentive to generate and release more infor-
mation, our market might also place a drag on the same forces by 
reducing the incentive of outsiders to produce and share infor-
mation about firms and their prospects. 
Firms—and therefore stocks—have fundamental values that 
are based on the future cash flows that they are likely to pro-
duce.224 Stocks’ market prices reflect these fundamental values to 
varying degrees. When those prices are closer to fundamental val-
ues, they are said to have a higher degree of accuracy. Conversely, 
when they are farther from those values, they are said to have a 
lower degree of accuracy. 
Traders have the incentive to produce information that al-
lows them to identify inaccurate stock market prices because they 
can use that information to profit by purchasing stocks that are 
priced inaccurately low or selling ones that are priced inaccu-
rately high.225 As a byproduct of this profit-motivated trading, 
they place enough upward or downward pressure, respectively, 
on prices to cause them to better reflect the information on which 
they are trading. This price-correcting work has long been lauded, 
as it incorporates valuable information into prices, thereby shar-
ing it with all in ways that improve economic efficiency.226 
Crucially, though, these traders will produce information and 
impound it into prices only if they expect to earn revenues that 
 
 224 In the finance context, the term “fundamental value” refers to the present value 
of the future cash flows that stockholders expect to receive. See, for example, Kahan, 41 
Duke L J at 979 n 11 (cited in note 7) (defining “fundamental value” as “the best estimate 
at any time, and given all information available at such time, of the discounted value of 
all distributions . . . accruing to a stockholder who continues to hold the stock”). 
 225 See, for example, Goshen and Parchomovsky, 55 Duke L J at 726 (cited in note 5) 
(“[I]nformation traders detect discrepancies between [a stock’s fundamental] value and 
[market] price based on the information they possess. They then trade to capture the value 
of their informational advantage.”). 
 226 See notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
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exceed the costs associated with their work. The more profit they 
expect to earn from informed trades, the stronger their incentive 
to engage in this valuable work. Conversely, the less profit they 
expect to garner, the weaker that incentive. The extent to which 
information about firms is generated and signaled by outsiders is 
affected by these traders’ expected profits.227 
Our proposal, we soberly admit, reduces these profits. The 
more precise concern is that shifting from a securities law system 
in which information traders get corporate information for free 
(without advanced notice to ordinary investors) to one in which 
they must pay for first access to that information (with notice to 
the entire marketplace) would add to the traders’ costs while also 
taking away from their revenues. In different words, opening up 
a market for corporate disclosures would allow companies to 
charge these traders for what they now get for free while also de-
creasing their take from ordinary investors due to the transpar-
ency measures we include.228 This one-two punch dictates that 
many of these traders would have higher costs and lower reve-
nues than they now have. The result would be a diminished in-
centive to undertake their socially valuable work, thereby reduc-
ing one of the key things our proposal supposedly bolsters. 
We take these concerns seriously. But it is important to iden-
tify the scope of the harm that the proposal presents to infor-
mation production. That scope is limited in two main ways. 
First, our market approach to information dissemination 
would affect only trading based on the information found in cor-
porate disclosures. While this information is of paramount im-
portance to many traders, information trading as a whole fo-
cuses on a far wider range of information. For example, many 
information traders focus not on sales data generated and re-
leased by firms but instead on their own, earlier-produced pro-
jections of that data. Others focus on extracorporate infor-
mation, for example by analyzing satellite images of orange 
groves before the government releases its report on the state of 
those crops.229 Allowing a market for corporate disclosures would 
 
 227 For an overview of these points on the connection between information trading 
and stock-price accuracy with a focus on the effects of legal drags on information-trader 
profits, see generally Kevin S. Haeberle, Stock-Market Law and Accuracy of Public 
Companies’ Stock Prices, 2015 Colum Bus L Rev 121. 
 228 See Part IV.A.2. 
 229 See Bradley Hope, Tiny Satellites: The Latest Innovation Hedge Funds Are Using 
to Get a Leg Up (Wall St J, Aug 14, 2016), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/satellites 
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often leave the costs associated with these types of information 
trading untouched. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the information in 
corporate disclosures is disclosed to the entire public, both today 
and under our proposal. For that reason, it will get into market 
prices eventually. And there is strong reason to believe that 
“eventually” today is, well, more like immediately.230 Under the 
suggested information-dissemination regime, the process is un-
likely to be much different at its core: the information contained 
in corporate disclosures would get incorporated into market 
prices immediately after it is released, as information traders 
could profit on it only if they traded on it immediately.231 
Ultimately, though, we cannot say with certainty that the 
early-access market would improve overall levels of information 
production and sharing. But we can say that the market’s nega-
tive effect on the incentive of outsiders to produce information 
about firms’ prospects must be weighed against its positive one 
on the incentive of firms to produce information about them-
selves. We can also say that securities law has long taken the 
common sense view that firms are the lowest-cost suppliers of in-
formation about themselves.232 Indeed, that is the crux of the ar-
gument for the very foundation of modern federal securities law, 
the mandatory disclosure regime.233 Thus the implementation of 
our proposal would not represent the first time the law intervened 
in a manner that reduced information-trader profits, yet in-
creased information production and sharing. Thus, there is still 
much reason to believe that the incentives for efficient infor-
mation production and sharing that the proposed market creates 
dominate those it takes away. 
Also, recall that our proposal is motivated by more than just 
the desire to spur information production where there is now too 
little. It also seeks to, among other things, rein in disclosure 
 
-hedge-funds-eye-in-the-sky-1471207062 (visited Apr 9, 2018) (Perma archive unavaila-
ble) (describing a company that “mines satellite imagery for trading tips for hedge funds”). 
 230 See Hu, Pan, and Wang, 126 J Fin Econ at 406–10 (cited in note 14). 
 231 See id. 
 232 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, What Works 
in Securities Laws?, 61 J Fin 1, 5 (2006); Fox, 109 Colum L Rev at 268 (cited in note 7) 
(discussing how, in situations “where the information either is already known to the issuer 
or can easily be discovered by it, . . . the issuer is clearly the least cost provider” of corporate 
information). 
 233 See notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
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where there is now too much.234 Some scholars have even gone as 
far as positing that the defining role of modern securities law is 
to support a robust market for the work of outside securities ana-
lysts.235 But the status quo may be resulting in the production of 
the current level of corporate information by a group (outsiders) 
other than the one that could produce it at the lowest cost (firms). 
Adding the precise political economy of the information-
overproduction concern into the mix should make this assertion 
and the implications that follow especially thought-provoking.236 
It follows that any information-trader costs generated by the 
proposed alterations to securities law may provide only a coun-
terweight to what may be viewed as excessive existing legal sup-
port for those very market participants. In different words, there 
will still be enough profit incentive to generate information and 
correct inaccurate market prices for those who are best able to 
determine the import of new corporate information and trade on 
it. So long as enough of those traders continue to engage in this 
competition, an optimal level of external information production 
and sharing may take hold, leaving PhD-level astrophysicists and 
their colleagues to assemble algorithms that analyze time, speed, 
and space rather than serially coordinated price movements in 
stock market order flow.237 
It bears mentioning that, even if the proposal has a net neg-
ative effect on price accuracy, it may nevertheless have an overall 
net positive effect on society due to the larger changes envi-
sioned—namely, those relating to securities fraud actions and in-
sider trading enforcement. Indeed, in addition to the independent 
 
 234 See Part II.A.1. 
 235 See, for example, Goshen and Parchomovsky, 55 Duke L J at 781 (cited in note 5) 
(“[T]he essential role of securities regulation is to facilitate and maintain a competitive 
market for [noninsider] information traders.”). 
 236 See Part II.A.1. 
 237 Interestingly, in addition to its fairness motivation, Reg FD was motivated by a 
desire to ensure robust competition in the information-trading market. See 65 Fed Reg at 
51716–19 (cited in note 128). The regulation no doubt helped on this front by ensuring 
that all information traders could begin the race to price new information on equal footing. 
Our proposal leaves this aspect of Reg FD in force, as nothing about our information mar-
ket would stop information traders from accessing disclosures when they are first released 
beyond the firm so long as they can afford the market price of admission. We also believe 
the price of admission will follow the Michigan consumer sentiment model, see note 220 
and accompanying text, thereby involving not some monopoly buyer but instead a robust 
group of information traders. After all, if only one buyer purchased first access to a disclo-
sure in a transparent market, profitable trading based on that information might not be 
available. Firms would therefore have the incentive to price the early-access rights in a 
way that attracts a far larger group of traders. 
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benefits touted earlier, the changes to these areas of law would 
provide a disclosure-enhancing force. For one thing, firms would 
likely be more willing to share information if not for the current 
overbroad approach to securities fraud suits.238 For another, if 
firms did in fact further restrict illicit trading on company infor-
mation, outside analysts would have more room for profit239—
profit that would incentivize more information generation.240 
A final point is worth mentioning briefly. If the market has 
the deterrence impact we expect—to reduce the number of noise 
traders and other uninformed traders in the market during early-
release periods—and that results in professional traders reducing 
their activity to suboptimal levels, this would be a valuable fact 
about the world that we learned. It would suggest that securities 
markets function best when extra-informational investors are 
fleeced by the professionals. This might be a bargain worth de-
fending, as the profits the professionals earn are perhaps the only 
way to get much important information produced and reflected 
into stock prices in a timely manner. But at the very least, this 
result would lay bare the reality of the market and cast doubt on 
the SEC’s claim that its “fairness” rules are about protecting av-
erage investors. If we are going to promote a securities market in 
which average investors are encouraged in various ways (or at 
least not actively discouraged) to invest in individual stocks based 
on changes in corporate information merely as a means of trans-
ferring wealth from them to the professionals, we should at least 
know this is what we are doing and be honest about it. Our pro-
posed market would tell us whether this is what we are in fact 
doing and whether it is in fact necessary. 
4. The disclosure overproduction signal is incomplete. 
Another concern specific to the quality-of-disclosure point 
would be that the disclosure overproduction signal is far from 
complete. Here, the specific argument would be that early-access 
demand for corporate information will likely represent only a sub-
set of overall demand for that information. For that reason, while 
that demand will certainly signal much about which disclosure 
content is and is not valuable for information consumers to have 
before others, the signal at times would say much less about what 
 
 238 See Part II.B. 
 239 See note 29 and accompanying text. 
 240 See note 29 and accompanying text; Part III.B.3. 
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information is and is not more generally valuable to them, let 
alone to society as a whole. For example, shareholders qua share-
holders might not be interested in paying for early-access rights 
to conflict mineral disclosures, as those disclosures might have no 
impact on the firm’s financial value.241 Yet that information could 
be something that society as a whole values at a level above and 
beyond its cost of production. For this reason, a lack of demand 
for early access to corporate information will not provide a dispos-
itive judgment of its social value. Instead, it will provide only an-
other input to be considered when determining that value. 
Of course, to the extent nonshareholders (including the me-
dia, corporate watchdogs, and others with extramarket demand 
for early access to corporate information) participate in early-
access markets, the informational signal would be broader. But it 
is far from clear that their lack of interest in early access to any 
given piece of information indicates a lack of appreciation of that 
information—especially given that their use of the information, by 
definition, is not based on trading on it before its value depreciates. 
Whatever the precise power of the informational signal on 
disclosure overproduction generated by the early-access market, 
it is clear that the signal based on trading-specific information 
alone would still help lawmakers identify instances of Congress 
and the SEC wanting investors to know more than those market 
participants want to know on the margin. For this reason, the in-
formation market provides a step in the right direction even if it 
will not comprehensively identify each and every aspect of disclo-
sure overproduction. 
C. Objections Specific to Securities Fraud Law 
A number of thoughtful objections to our claims on the mar-
ket’s ability to improve private securities litigation must also be 
considered in determining the overall desirability of our new ap-
proach to securities law. 
1. Applicability of earlier objections. 
For starters, it is important to briefly note the applicability 
of two of the objections considered above with respect to securities 
disclosure law, as it is clear that insufficient supply or demand 
would undercut much of our claim as to the market’s potential to 
 
 241 See note 75 and accompanying text. 
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improve private securities litigation. Focusing on the litigation-
specific demand concern here should suffice to make the point. 
 If demand for early access is very small, then PIM class ac-
tions would also be very small—perhaps too small to have dam-
ages sufficiently deter fraud. Indeed, if you have a small market 
with relatively few purchasers of information, the market might 
fail to generate sufficient economies of scale for a securities fraud 
lawsuit altogether, thereby rendering it insufficient for victim-
compensation purposes as well.242 
Of course, courts could deploy the PIM presumption in only 
those cases in which the disclosure at issue was released in an 
active information market and continue to use the FOTM pre-
sumption in all other cases. Perhaps judges would presume a ro-
bust market unless plaintiffs demonstrated the absence of one at 
the class certification stage. In the end, our approach could be a 
large step in the right direction even if courts used the PIM pre-
sumption in only some subset of the universe of putative 
§ 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 class actions. 
Still, whatever the precise judicial response to any anemic 
demand for early-access products, weak demand would clearly re-
duce much of the appeal of our device for cleaning up securities 
fraud class actions. The same goes with respect to weak supply. 
However, as noted here, all-or-none thinking obscures the fact 
that the PIM presumption can, at a minimum, help improve the 
status quo. And the case we lay out earlier for believing there will 
be robust demand and supply—and therefore a viable PIM pre-
sumption—must be considered as well.243 Indeed, the ability for 
firms to replace the FOTM presumption with a PIM one would 
give firms powerful incentives to provide investors with early-
access products they value. Our earlier explanations also show 
that there is limited downside to permitting the market to tell us 
that all of our thinking on both demand and supply is off.244 
2. The PIM presumption is overinclusive. 
Another objection to using our information market to address 
the current gross overbreadth of the FOTM presumption is that 
our PIM replacement is itself overinclusive. 
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 243 See Part IV.B; Part III.A; Haeberle and Henderson, 35 Yale J Reg at 401–10 (cited 
in note 26).  
 244 See Part IV.B.1. 
1384 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1313 
 
Many traders could purchase early-access rights to a firm’s 
disclosures that included a corporate misrepresentation and then 
trade in the firm’s securities—albeit not based on the misrepre-
sentation. This is because corporate disclosures will likely con-
tinue to be largely bundled so that they contain a variety of infor-
mation, and traders will purchase early-access rights based only 
on some subset of that information. That information may have 
little or no relation to the misrepresentation. For example, sup-
pose that the information market is characterized by a long line 
of investment fund customers, each of which pays only a rela-
tively small price for the early-access products sold by Thor 
Industries (a medium-capitalization public company that manu-
factures recreational vehicles).245 If many of these funds buy Thor 
Industries stock just after its latest disclosure is released to them, 
yet do so based only on the reliable statements found in the dis-
closure, then it is likely that many investors will be able to satisfy 
the PIM presumption in any ensuing litigation arising out of some 
other misstatement in the same disclosure. 
While we think this objection is worth considering, our ap-
proach would still represent a step in the right direction—here, a 
giant one—because the plaintiff class will be reduced from basi-
cally everyone who purchased during the inflationary period to 
just those who purchase in that period after taking an additional 
step (purchasing access to the disclosure) that evidences their reli-
ance on the misstatement. Moreover, this objection should be con-
sidered against not just the ill-advised status quo, but also the com-
mon calls to replace it with a system that scraps private 
enforcement of § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 in whole or one that moves to 
mandatory arbitration in a way that eliminates class actions in the 
area altogether.246 Some degree of overinclusion may thus be far 
preferable to the gross overinclusion of the status quo or the gross 
underinclusion of today’s most prominent competing proposals. 
3. The PIM presumption is underinclusive. 
One could also construct an opposite argument: that there is 
an element of underinclusion to our PIM presumption. There will 
be instances in which a nonparticipating fundamental-value 
trader makes a purchase during an inflationary period based on 
 
 245 History (Thor Industries, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/CET4-VLJ5. 
 246 See note 19 and accompanying text. 
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a false or misleading corporate statement, but only based on read-
ing it in the full public release. Our presumption alone would not 
allow this trader into the plaintiff class despite actual reliance. 
Today, this underinclusiveness is not present thanks to the 
FOTM presumption, which casts a net large enough to grab such 
a trader—for better or worse. 
We do not think this particular underinclusion objection has 
more than surface-level appeal. The stock market we contemplate 
would be one in which information found in newly released corpo-
rate information (including misstated information) begins to be 
incorporated into prices when it is first released. For that reason, 
these traders would either have no actual damages (because the 
misstatement on which they are trading was already fully incor-
porated into prices) or limited damages (because much of that in-
formation was already incorporated into prices). And there is much 
reason to believe that the former situation would dominate.247 
Still, there is another underinclusion concern to consider 
here. Even if firms provide much information to investors on a 
tiered basis in our information market, at least some firms will 
provide some information to all at the same time with some fre-
quency. When that is the case and the information is false or mis-
leading, no one can meet the requirements of our PIM presump-
tion, as there was no information market in which to participate. 
But here too the information market provides only upside. 
Evidence of routine participation in these information mar-
kets in general along with a purchase in an inflationary time pe-
riod would tell us much about the likelihood of actual reliance. 
Judges could use that evidence to allow these frequent 
information-market participants to join in the class so long as 
they demonstrated sufficient likelihood of actual reliance. These 
traders can thus be eligible for a PIM presumption even when 
they did not participate in a specific information market that in-
cluded tiered release of the specific information at issue. For these 
reasons, the class-action vehicle would still be a possibility for 
these private suits. 
Moreover, although we do not favor it, a broader fix to either 
of these types of underinclusiveness concerns could be considered. 
In particular, judges could enlarge the PIM presumption by inter-
preting “participated in the information market” to refer to not 
 
 247  See note 193 and accompanying text. 
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just participation as a buyer of early releases, but also participa-
tion as a subscriber to the ultimate public release. This interpre-
tation would open the door for a larger universe of information 
traders to essentially opt in to the potential class by signing up 
for at least the public release of the information that we mandate. 
These subscribers would thus obtain a direct email or similar 
means of accessing the disclosure at issue upon the end of the 
sneak-peek window. In this way, even those who did not pay for 
early access could benefit from the presumption—so long as they 
did in fact receive the information and then purchase shares at 
inflated prices. This could be accomplished without reopening the 
door to gross overcompensation; judicial tools could be developed 
to keep it at least partially shut. For example, judges could allow 
the presumption of reliance to be rebutted more easily by defend-
ants when it comes to those claiming participation in the market 
in this more basic way. Or they could deploy subclasses for dam-
ages purposes, with those receiving only the public release (and 
trading only after it) receiving only any damages they incurred, 
which would likely be little, if any.248 
Stepping back, it is important to see that these caveats and 
examples we use to respond to the underinclusive objection far 
from undermine our approach. Instead, they should make our 
larger litigation-specific point clear: the information market has 
the potential to help improve the status quo by providing a mech-
anism for better identifying those who are actually harmed by se-
curities fraud. That potential matters for each of the two aims of 
these suits. Our larger point here is thus not to provide any pre-
cise formulation of the rule that courts should use. Instead, it is 
to open the door to a discussion about how the information market 
can serve as the basis for coming up with such a rule that gets a 
more optimal compensation and deterrence bang for the suits’ 
buck. To be sure, wrinkles associated with the new approach 
would have to be ironed out by the federal courts, perhaps with 
guidance or even more direct intervention from the SEC or 
Congress. But all in all, the flexibility embodied in our suggested 
approach provides courts with a way to select a far more optimal 
scope of private securities litigation than that of the approach in 
existence today. 
Lastly, it is worth noting two important points relating to any 
concern about underinclusion in the PIM plaintiff class. First, our 
 
 248 See note 193 and accompanying text. 
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presumption would leave the larger assurances against corporate 
fraud in place. A number of other existing sticks would continue 
to whack those who committed securities fraud. The strength of 
public enforcement actions, which do not require proof of any re-
liance, would be untouched by our proposal. The SEC and its 
Division of Enforcement have the power to prosecute securities 
fraud and routinely do. They can even distribute their recoveries 
to victims.249 And the DOJ can bring securities fraud criminal ac-
tions so long as the fraud is willful.250 Along the same lines, state-
level enforcement should not be forgotten. And market forces that 
provide carrots and sticks that combine to curb corporate fraud 
would likewise continue to operate in full force. For example, 
CEOs who pump up stock prices with misstatements might sur-
vive the quarter. But eventually their lack of integrity will likely 
be exposed as information comes out to the market. All the while, 
whatever short-term personal boon they receive from steering a 
ship with a higher market value over some period is likely out-
weighed by the expected costs associated with directing it into the 
rough seas ahead with the exposure of their fraud. 
Second, the plaintiffs in this class would likely have smaller 
damages than the plaintiffs who flood these class actions today. 
After all, these investors will often have purchased as soon as the 
new (false) information came out in reliance on the information 
itself (or at least information with which it is bundled). For that 
reason, they would have paid something less than the price the 
information dictated, as it is these traders’ buying that drives up 
the price to reflect that information. They thus buy shares at, for 
example, $8.01, $8.02, and so on until their buying (as a group) 
pushes the market price up to reflect that new information (say 
$10). So using the current measure of damages in these cases251 
would lead to lower damages per average class member than that 
in existence today when portfolio traders (who generally purchase 
once the price has already adjusted upward) are included in the 
class and therefore get the amount they paid minus the amount 
of the deflation that occurs when the market ultimately learns of 
the previous misstatement. Thus, our damages measure would 
 
 249  See 15 USC § 7246(a) (authorizing the SEC to provide victims of securities viola-
tions with disgorged funds and civil penalties the agency collects from those who harm 
them). 
 250  Section 32 of the Exchange Act criminalizes any conduct that “willfully violates 
any provision of [the Exchange Act].” 15 USC § 78ff. 
 251 See note 110. 
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decrease the overall damages in these suits in two ways: first by 
reducing the number of plaintiffs in the class and second by in-
cluding only those who generally would have lower damages. 
From a victim-compensation perspective, that is a good thing. The 
law should compensate only actual victims, and it should address 
only the actual harm they have suffered. Still, we admit that the 
underinclusiveness objections outlined here could give rise to at 
least an interesting conversation about whether the resulting 
damages would cause the opposite deterrence problem (under-
deterrence) to the one in existence today (overdeterrence). But as 
should be clear from this Section, our proposal allows for a num-
ber of levers to be pulled to better turn out a more optimal private 
securities fraud mechanism. 
D. Objections and Framework Specific to Insider Trading Law 
Finally, thoughtful critics might question the extent to which 
our information market would actually improve insider trading 
enforcement. 
1. Applicability of earlier objections. 
As with the objections specific to the market’s potential to im-
prove securities fraud law, earlier objections discussed in detail 
with respect to securities disclosure law apply here as well. Spe-
cifically, the objections relating to possible insufficient supply and 
demand are pertinent here. If firms cannot sell their disclosures 
at a high enough price to enough buyers, then the incentive to 
crack down on insider trading provided by the information mar-
ket will be eliminated. The same can be said if firms do not want 
to supply these products. In the interest of brevity, we will not 
repeat our analysis of why there might be inadequate supply 
and/or demand. But it is worth repeating that there is little to 
fear from allowing the market itself to tell us the relevant levels 
of market activity. 
2. It will actually lead to more insider trading. 
One might also contend that our market would lead to more 
insider trading for two related reasons. First, it is possible that 
firms would find their information to be of most value to early-
access consumers if they held back information for longer periods. 
If that was the case, our approach would create longer periods in 
which insiders could use the firm’s private information for profit 
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in securities markets. Second, it is likewise possible that our ap-
proach would introduce a bidding process that would take place 
after firms announced their intention to disclose new information 
in an upcoming tiered-release window to take place in, for 
example, a day. In that interim between disclosure of upcoming 
disclosure and the disclosure release itself, there would be room 
for insiders to use the firm’s information in nefarious ways. 
We do not believe that either of these concerns are material. 
First, delaying disclosure in the name of building up its value is 
a risky proposition. If outside sources figure out the information 
in part or in whole, the information would lose its value to the 
same degree. Indeed, material information would likely have the 
most value to firms when it carries the biggest surprise for mar-
kets. So the incentive to accelerate disclosure would likely domi-
nate any incentive to hold back information to build up its 
value.252 Also, a firm would have to comply with the four-day re-
quirements of 8-K material and the quarterly requirements for 
10-Q materials. These requirements place outside limits on any 
such delay gamesmanship. 
Second, we do not believe the bidding concern will be present. 
We expect a subscription model to firm information and not one-
off auctions each time a firm has new information to disclose.253 
Firms would thus have the incentive to maintain the value of 
their disclosure products, lest the market lose interest in early-
release subscriptions. Moreover, the releases could be keyed to set 
information-release windows, determined by either firms or reg-
ulators well before any specific early-release is contemplated.254 
This would also erase any of the bidding-period concern. But even 
if firms held one-off auctions, we do not fear excessive insider 
trading during the period from auction announcement through 
early release. This is because it is hard to imagine that those pe-
riods would be long. The mere disclosure of upcoming disclosure 
would trigger speculation that would cause volatility and related 
illiquidity in a firm’s stock, each of which is bad for firm value. 
Management would therefore have much reason to avoid any de-
lay from disclosure announcement to actual release. Further, any 
trading or tipping activity during such a period would be easier 
 
 252 This response should also assuage any concerns one might have relating to a 
delayed-disclosure objection against our claims in Part III.B.1 relating to our approach’s 
potential to improve the frequency of disclosure. 
 253 See Part III.A. 
 254 See note 202 and accompanying text. 
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for both firms and the government to detect. Knowing that, insid-
ers would be less likely to pursue it. 
* * * 
This final Part has considered a number of interesting objec-
tions to pursuing our information market. Some, we have 
demonstrated, do not withstand scrutiny, such as those rooted in 
hoary notions of fairness and a lack of understanding of the me-
chanics and economics of securities markets. Others, we concede, 
provide compelling reasons for at least questioning the degree to 
which our market-based approach would in fact improve securi-
ties law. For example, there is no doubt that the full social bene-
fits associated with enhanced corporate disclosure that could 
arise out of the market rely on sufficient activity on both the sup-
ply side and the demand one—and we cannot guarantee robust 
market activity. But while legitimate concerns exist, there are 
also a variety of reasons to expect a market that produces some 
significant degree of each of the benefits we envision. Moreover, 
interaction among the various aspects of our proposal should not 
be overlooked. For example, the savings from our PIM presump-
tion would provide considerable incentives for firms to participate 
in the market on the supply side. Likewise, that same approach 
to securities fraud class actions would provide traders with a sig-
nificant incentive to participate in the market on the demand side 
by tying class action eligibility to information-market participa-
tion. And crucially, even if we are wrong on these points, little 
harm would result from the experiment. In sum, our new market-
based approach to securities law calls for a serious conversation, 
and that conversation should include consideration of the objec-
tions we explore in this Part but also acknowledge the realistic 
boundaries of each. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes a new approach to securities law: per-
mit a market for the public-company information that sits at the 
center of modern securities law. This approach would allow the 
reshaping of the law around the market to address the areas’ fun-
damental flaws. By repealing Reg FD and reforming regulatory 
attitudes about tiered information releases, demand for infor-
mation would be unleashed in a way that motivates firms to pro-
vide not just the information they already produce today, but ad-
ditional amounts, in improved formats, and at more optimal 
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frequencies. The forces of information supply and demand would 
likewise provide a powerful signal as to which information that 
must be disclosed today is and is not valued by actual information 
consumers. All the while, the information market would help 
identify the real victims of securities fraud, thereby guiding 
judges, the SEC, or Congress to a new reliance presumption that 
would help private securities class actions better achieve each of 
their two chief aims. Lastly, no longer forced to share their infor-
mation on equal terms with all for free, a number of company 
stakeholders would have more incentive to police illegal trading 
by insiders, resulting in a reduction in the negative externalities 
of insider trading on the margin. 
Important questions remain. For many of those questions, 
only the proposed information market itself can provide the an-
swer. Delving too far down each possible twist and turn relating 
to those objections and relevant counterpoints can obscure that 
point. This Article is not a three-hundred-page SEC proposing re-
lease. But by providing the close look at key objections and their 
weight in Part IV while attempting to avoid excessive analysis of 
issues that may or may not arise, we have provided a thoughtful 
framework for debate that is sure to follow. Still, it bears empha-
sizing that our exploration of the aforementioned possible objec-
tions shows their limits as much as their power. 
Whatever the outcome of that debate, it is important to em-
phasize three final points here. 
First, any negative effects of the market must be weighed 
against the totality of the benefits it would bring—beyond even 
those relating to the optimality of public-company disclosure, pri-
vate securities class actions, and insider trading enforcement. To 
the astute observer of securities law, our information market 
should hold much additional promise beyond that in focus 
above.255 
 
 255 Two notable examples bear mention. First, the core informational signal provided 
by the market could also be deployed to help make the materiality determinations that 
are so central to the full range of public and private securities actions. The obvious (rebut-
table) presumption would be that information purchased in an information market was 
material under the Supreme Court’s definition of that term of art, see note 90 and accom-
panying text, and that information not purchased was immaterial. This presumption 
would increase litigation certainty for litigants (including potential ones) and ease the 
burden of the judges and juries making materiality findings. All the while, it would leave 
much room for rebuttal due to additional considerations, such as those that dictate the 
materiality determination today. 
 Second, the market could also be used to address the nonpurchaser/nonseller problem 
of private securities suits. Today, a bright-line rule blocks all those who forgo transacting 
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Second, a key feature of our proposal is that it calls for a well-
regulated market, including through requirements of transpar-
ency, open access to all consumers, and full public disclosure of 
any early-released information within a relatively short time pe-
riod. In other words, our proposal is something very different than 
a call to simply return to what existed before Reg FD, when reg-
ulatory animus toward tiered information revelation restricted 
the market for legal tiered information release to shady, 
backroom deals, which—even when legal—couldn’t improve secu-
rities law in the ways explained in this Article. In fact, the pursuit 
of our market and these benefits should be bolstered considerably 
by the well-known “secret” that Reg FD has failed to stop such 
selective disclosure and that insider trading law leaves a large 
gap for problematic selective disclosure.256 While the Second 
Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Supreme Court have struggled in re-
cent years to determine the extent to which current insider trad-
ing law under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can address this gap more 
generally,257 one must wonder whether the more promising return 
can be found in changes to much less prominent law—like those 
we have considered with respect to Reg FD alone. 
Third, stepping back from even these two more general points 
reveals what will surely be the most surprising (and sobering) 
broader insight of this Article for many readers: the most power-
ful resistance to pursuit of such a market-based approach to se-
curities law to improve overall social welfare is likely provided not 
by principled concerns like those found in the framework for de-
bate set forth in Part IV, but instead by our approach’s wealth-
distributive effects and its related political economy. 
Our market (namely, the regulatory components we would 
impose) reduces the profits of information-trading investors to 
protect portfolio-trading ones.258 At the same time, our PIM pre-
sumption moves wealth away from portfolio investors and to 
 
in the market from pursuing relief under § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5, shutting courthouse doors on 
them out of fear of additional nonvictims burdening the federal courts. See generally Blue 
Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Store, 421 US 723 (1975). But the proposed information mar-
ket could jar the door open for relying nonpurchasers/nonsellers by making those in this 
group who purchase access to a fraudulent disclosure sympathetic plaintiffs while still 
keeping the masses out—thus using the information market in yet another way to better 
identify the appropriate class of plaintiffs in § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 private actions. 
 256 See note 185 and accompanying text. 
 257 See generally Salman, 137 S Ct 420 (2017); United States v Salman, 792 F3d 1087 
(9th Cir 2015); United States v Newman, 773 F3d 438 (2d Cir 2014). 
 258 See Part IV.B.3 
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firms, at least in the first instance.259 The changes we envision 
thus involve some wealth transfer among participants in the mar-
ket even if they have larger social benefits. For that reason, our 
approach might face SEC headwinds to the extent the agency is 
focused on “investor” protection rather than social welfare. That 
the SEC may be formally required to engage in investor-welfare 
analysis rather than social-welfare analysis provides a further 
headwind against the change to Reg FD and related regulatory 
attitudes we envision.260 
Each of these concerns is exacerbated by the fact that invest-
ment funds are a concentrated interest group, whereas average 
shareholders are dispersed and rationally apathetic.261 To the ex-
tent our approach results in the funds shouldering more of the 
cost of disclosure and losing out on FOTM recoveries, they would 
likely oppose our approach. Moreover, these funds would find sup-
port from fellow concentrated groups, such as trial lawyers, who 
plainly stand to lose if courts used our market as the focal point 
for their reliance presumption. Ultimately, progress that could be 
gained from infusing modern securities law with a well-regulated 
information market would ironically be impeded not out of the 
concerns for ordinary investors and fairness one might have had 
before reading this Article, but instead out of these unfortunate 
realities of our current democracy. 
 
 259 See Part III.B.2. 
 260 See generally Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency Criterion for Securities Regulation: 
Investor Welfare or Total Surplus?, 57 Ariz L Rev 85 (2015). 
 261 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of 
Institutional Investors, 31 J Econ Perspectives 89, 89–93 (discussing the rise and concen-
tration of equity ownership in institutional investors in contrast to the traditional disper-
sion of ownership among individual shareholders). 
